



Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes

Author(s): Ora John Reuter and Graeme B. Robertson

Source: *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January 2015), pp. 235-248

Published by: [The University of Chicago Press](#) on behalf of the [Southern Political Science Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/678390>

Accessed: 23/07/2015 20:01

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



The University of Chicago Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes

Ora John Reuter, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and Higher School of Economics, Moscow
Graeme B. Robertson, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

A key debate in the new literature on authoritarianism concerns the role of institutions in general and legislatures in particular. While much of the literature accepts that authoritarian legislatures matter, there is little agreement as to why and how. In this article, we argue that a key function of authoritarian legislatures is to help leaders reduce social protest. In contrast to existing literature, which stresses the representative function of authoritarian legislatures, we argue that legislatures reduce social protest by providing rent-seeking opportunities to key opposition elites who, in return for access to these spoils, demobilize their supporters. We test this argument using original data on the distribution of leadership positions in 83 Russian regional legislatures and two new datasets on opposition protest in Russia. Our findings suggest that legislative cooptation may extend the lifespan of authoritarian regimes by helping to reduce antiregime protest.

As election results rolled in from around Russia on Sunday December 4, 2011, it became clear that the ruling United Russia party had had a difficult day at the polls. While retaining its parliamentary majority, United Russia (UR) had beaten the second placed Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) by a smaller than expected margin. Meanwhile, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov appeared on television, accusing the regime of perpetrating massive fraud and demanding a review of the results. The following night, a wave of protest began that ultimately brought thousands of oppositionists—including liberals, nationalists, social democrats, and Communists—onto the streets. For the first time in many years, the regime seemed to wobble, as parliamentary and extraparliamentary oppositions united in protest.¹

However, as protest from the nonparliamentary opposition grew, the Communists performed a stunning volte-face. In a public manifesto, Zyuganov rejected street protests as a strategy for contesting the election results, claiming that

the protest movement aimed to return to power “the ultra-liberal forces . . . who destroyed the USSR and created the current system of electoral falsifications.”² Since then, Zyuganov and the KPRF leadership has maintained a safe distance from the protest movement, which became dominated by groups affiliated with the extraparliamentary opposition. Why the Communists pulled back from the brink was clear to most Russian observers. The State Duma elections saw the party’s seat share double. Moreover, the United Russia majority in the Duma voted to give the KPRF a vice speakership and six committee chairmanships, three times as many leadership positions as the party had enjoyed in the previous convocation. The Communists clearly had a lot at stake in the new Duma.

This sequence of events, in which legislative positions were used to coopt potentially important opposition, is a useful illustration of how formal institutions in general, and legislatures in particular, play a role in the politics of contemporary authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes face

Ora John Reuter is an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Graeme B. Robertson is an Associate Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599.

1. This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). Supplementary material for this article is available at the “Supplements” link in the online edition. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results are available at <https://sites.google.com/site/ojreuter/>

2. “Russia requires changes! Statement of G.A. Zyuganov regarding the mass protest actions “For Honest Elections!” and “Russia without Putin!” February 6, 2012. <http://kprf.ru/crisis/offer/102209.html> (accessed November 4, 2012).

The Journal of Politics, volume 77, number 1. Published online December 23, 2014. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678390>
© 2015 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2015/7701-0018 \$10.00

235

a range of threats including insurrections and mass protests, as well as palace and military coups, but several important studies have found that authoritarian regimes with legislative institutions are more durable than authoritarian regimes without such institutions (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). However, the mechanisms that underpin the relationship between institutions and durability are debated.

Some argue that legislative institutions stabilize authoritarian rule primarily by helping to forestall coups and conspiracies among the ruling elite. According to this view, legislatures provide information that allows authoritarian rulers to monitor one another and so prevent destabilizing conflict within the ruling group (Svolik 2012). However, a different, more common view is that the main threat to authoritarian regimes comes from insurgencies and mass protest. Legislatures help to ward off this threat by involving more voices in policymaking and making politics more *representative* of key social groups (Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Shuler 2010). In this article, we share this focus on mass protest, but we detail a different set of mechanisms through which legislative cooptation works. In contrast to the representation account, our perspective centers on the role legislatures play in *personal cooptation*, that is, in allocating rents and particularistic benefits to key opposition *elites*. While other scholars have noted that parliamentarians in authoritarian regimes receive particularistic benefits (Blaydes 2011; Lust-Okar 2005; Reuter and Turovsky, n.d.), we move further to show how the specific institutional structure of legislatures facilitates the rationing of spoils to influential opposition elites, who, in return for access to these spoils, refrain from mobilizing their followers on the streets. Thus, legislatures help authoritarian leaders diffuse social protest because they are a device that can be used to allocate spoils among the would-be leaders of such protest.

Empirically, our article provides some of the first direct evidence of legislative cooptation's effects on social protest. While there is some evidence of cooptation from studies of legislator behavior in authoritarian parliaments (Malesky and Shuler 2010), most of the evidence on cooptation's broader social effects is indirect and comes from studies that show a correlation between the existence of legislatures and regime survival (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012). In this article, we exploit differences *between* authoritarian legislatures to identify the causal mechanisms that link legislative cooptation with social quiescence. Drawing on original data from 83 Russian regional legislatures, we look at how variation in the distribution of legislative leadership positions to the opposition affects levels of protest. By analyzing political units that have legisla-

tures but that vary in the degree of legislative cooptation, we minimize problems related to the endogenous creation of legislatures. Our findings indicate that when opposition elites hold key leadership positions in a legislature, protest by groups associated with those elites is reduced. We also distinguish leadership positions that offer significant opportunities for rent seeking from those that do not. Our findings show that providing elites with rent-seeking leadership opportunities does more to reduce protest than providing them with access to other less lucrative positions.

We incorporate into the analysis the fact that opposition in authoritarian regimes is rarely a unitary actor. We consider the effects of cooptation in the empirically common situation in which some opposition forces are permitted to participate in the electoral process and some are not (Lust-Okar 2005). We show that sharing legislative leadership positions with leaders of in-system opposition parties has no effect on protest by ideologically proximate groups that are excluded from legislatures. These findings support our conclusion that elite spoil sharing, not policy concessions, is the key mechanism linking legislative cooptation and reduced social protest.

COOPTATION IN AUTHORITARIAN LEGISLATURES

It is by now well-established that dictatorships with legislatures outlive those without (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), but there are disagreements as to the causal mechanism behind this finding. Existing theories focus on one of two mechanisms through which legislatures might make authoritarian rule more stable. One view is that legislatures help to insure members of the ruling elite against excessive centralization of power by one of their number and so help to head off a descent into personalistic dictatorship (Svolik 2012). However, sharing power among the ruling group is only one challenge facing authoritarian rulers. In order to make authoritarian rule sustainable, authoritarians must also counter threats from outside the ruling circle. This means building not just an elite consensus but broadening that consensus to ensure that the system does not face repeated challenges from actors in society. Scholars working in this area suggest that legislatures may allow authoritarian rulers to ape some features of democratic politics, either by including a broader set of actors who make policy concessions to important social groups (Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Shuler 2010) or by gathering information about demands for local public goods and channeling pork to disgruntled constituents (Manion 2013). Over time, the argument goes, this broadening of representation is likely to make authoritarian regimes more stable by defusing opposition and mitigating antiregime street protest.

While this may be an important channel through which legislative cooptation works, there are some problems with the representation account. First, much existing work on authoritarian legislatures suggests that the primary benefits that legislators receive are personalized benefits: opportunities for lobbying their own business interests, immunity from prosecution, and preferential access to state leaders (Blaydes 2011; Lust-Okar 2005; Reuter and Turovsky, n.d.). Furthermore, the evidence in favor of a representation-based account is limited. Malesky and Shuler (2010) show that legislators ask questions that reflect constituent demands, but they do not show either that legislators are successful in delivering policy benefits to constituents or that constituents are satisfied by the questions or concessions. Similarly, Manion (2013) shows that Chinese legislators focus on lobbying for the provision of pork to constituents but does not demonstrate that constituents' demands are assuaged as a result. Consequently, there is a missing link in the representation account.

PERSONAL COOPTATION AND ELITE-LED PROTEST

Nevertheless, even if the representation story is incomplete, there are other grounds for believing that authoritarian legislatures are a useful tool for coopting opposition groups and buying social peace. Instead of focusing on representation, we argue that legislative cooptation can also reduce social protest by offering elites direct access to the perks and spoils of office, which reduces their incentive to mobilize antiregime protest.

Much of the early literature on authoritarian institutions drew a fundamental distinction between regimes that maintained a legislature and those that did not (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). However, as the literature has developed, it has become increasingly clear that it is not just the existence of a legislature that shapes cooptation but also how that legislature is used. Indeed, given the fact that almost all contemporary dictatorships have legislatures, it seems that variation among authoritarian legislatures may be just as important as variation between dictatorships with and without legislatures.

Until now, most of the literature that differentiates among legislatures has focused on the institutional strength of the ruling party in the legislature (Magaloni 2008; Svobik 2012; Wright 2008). Much less studied, but also important in our view, are the ways in which rents, perks, and spoils are distributed among individual members of the legislature. As is well understood in the study of US congressional politics, the "industrial organization" of legislatures provides myriad additional opportunities for differentiating access to spoils (Fenno 1973; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Distributive

theories of legislative organization suggest that in order to understand legislative cooptation better, we need to go beyond the simple presence or absence of opposition parties in the legislature and look at the distribution of important leadership positions within the legislative chamber itself. A legislative leadership position may provide its holder with rent-seeking opportunities, a platform for lobbying for business interests, or perquisites such as increased staff and salary. Legislative leadership positions can also provide particular individuals with direct legal authority over questions of personal interest to them. Consequently, these key appointments can be used as *personal cooptation* to target representatives of the opposition and give them a special place within the bosom of the ruling regime.

In exchange for access to these spoils, elites are expected to use their influence and authority to defuse or divert anti-regime protest sentiment among their followers. Elites have considerable influence on protest in all political systems, and students of protest have long known that organizational and political resources matter enormously (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Moreover, there is evidence that the relative paucity of independent organizations in authoritarian regimes gives elites even more control than in democracies over the institutional resources needed to organize protest (Robertson 2011). Consequently, patterns of collective action are even more structured by elite politics in nondemocratic contexts. This ability of elites to shape protest, of course, is not absolute and is likely to vary from place to place. A number of factors will shape the capacity of elites to influence protesters. Simply not organizing protest events can have a larger effect in settings where alternative groups capable of mounting protests are either illegal or weak. Clearly too, elite influence will be higher where activists and organizers are able to share in some of the spoils. There is always a risk, however, that disappointed supporters will defect to other organizations and join their protests, assuming such organizations exist, or that the disappointed will organize "wildcat" actions on their own. This leads to the possibility that cooptation not only reduces protest but also, to some extent, displaces it. We test this possibility empirically below.

Of course, not all legislative leadership positions are equal. Differences in the nature of legislative positions allow authoritarian incumbents to calibrate the value of the spoils they share. We expect that the more important the leadership position offered within a legislature, the greater the reduction in protest by that leader's organization. In particular, rent-seeking opportunities, as opposed to policy influence, are likely to be more valuable in authoritarian settings for two reasons. First, legislatures and oppositions in authoritarian regimes are often excluded from the most

important broad-based policy decisions. Moreover, even if the opposition were to achieve some popular policy goal, the ruling party can easily take credit for the success. Second, the corruption and lack of transparency that attend nondemocratic systems increases the value of rent-seeking posts. With the blessing of the authorities, opposition elites can use such posts to enrich themselves with relative impunity. Thus, opposition politicians should value private benefits more highly than public goods and providing these elites with rent-seeking leadership positions should reduce protest more than providing them with other leadership positions. This is likely to be the case both because more valuable positions constitute a more effective bribe and because more valuable positions are likely to be given to more influential politicians. While these are theoretically separable mechanisms, in practice they are hard to distinguish empirically.

RESEARCH DESIGN: SUBNATIONAL LEGISLATURES

We test this view of legislative cooptation using data from subnational legislatures in Russia. This design allows us to minimize a particular type of endogeneity bias that plagues many cross-national studies of authoritarian legislatures. With few exceptions, existing studies use cross-national regressions to show that authoritarian regimes with legislatures are more long-lived than those without. The key independent variables in such analyses are either the existence of a legislature (Svolik 2012; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012) or the existence of some parties that are granted access to the legislature (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). While such results are important, these models are beset by endogeneity problems. In particular, the conditions that lead to the creation of legislatures may also influence the lifespan of the regime via some other pathway.

In order to deal with this type of endogeneity, we shift the focus from a cross-national analysis to looking at variation across subnational legislatures in one country, allowing us to eliminate endogeneity concerns related to the creation of legislatures. In post-Soviet Russia, there is no variation in the existence of legislatures. All of Russia's 83 regions have a directly elected legislative assembly. Importantly, however, there is variation across the regions in the extent to which legislative representation, influence, and spoils are granted to opposition parties.³ This means

3. In the vast majority of regions, opposition parties are seated in the regional legislature. This pattern reflects a global trend. Seventy-six percent of nondemocratic legislatures in 2012 had opposition parties in them, and the share of autocratic legislatures that seat opposition parties has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. See the online supplementary appendix

we can test the effect of personal cooptation separately from the mere existence of a legislature.

While the shift to the subnational level solves the problem of institutional endogeneity, it cannot eliminate all problems of inference. Perhaps most notably, as we will see below, the data structure does not offer enough intertemporal variation to make an empirical distinction between situations in which protest is reduced because institutional resources are used to buy-off existing protest leaders and the converse, in which institutional resources are made available to preempt protest. As a theoretical and practical matter these two effects are both likely to be present—strategic decisions are made to preempt protest, and when mistakes are made, legislative leadership positions are used to limit ongoing protest.

In moving to subnational legislatures, we are still considering institutions that have an important role in politics and the economy. Regional legislatures are key arenas in which elites compete to influence policy and receive spoils. Legislators receive personal benefits including an elevated public profile and a platform for lobbying their business interests. Moreover, the importance of regional parliaments is clear from the fact that most contain the directors of the region's major enterprises. Overall, 48% of regional deputies between 2001 and 2010 were businessmen (Reuter 2014). In a survey of 1,000 Russian firms conducted in December 2011, 30% of firm directors who conducted lobbying at the regional level reported that they focused their lobbying efforts on the regional legislature (Reuter and Turovsky, n.d.).

The Russian case is also instructive because open political protest is possible and because, like many such regimes, the political system consists of a number of "in-system" opposition parties, who participate in elections and hold legislative seats, and a set of groups, organizations and/or movements that are effectively barred from participating in elections. The latter is often called the "nonsystem" opposition.⁴ In the period we analyze, the main "in-system" opposition party was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).

The relationship between protest organized by groups affiliated with coopted leaders and protest by noncoopted groups is important in helping us distinguish between personalized and policy-based accounts of cooptation. If the cooptation of opposition leaders with leadership positions is just a marker for policy concessions made to the opposi-

4. For more on distinctions between in-system and nonsystem oppositions, see Lust-Okar (2005). Admission to the political system is regulated through a burdensome and complex registration process that has allowed the Kremlin to determine who can participate in elections.

tion, then such cooptation should reduce protest by all ideologically proximate groups that share similar policy demands. By contrast, if cooptation of opposition leaders with leadership positions is primarily about sharing private benefits with those individuals, then this cooptation should have no effect on protest by nonsystem groups. After all, these particularistic benefits are usually enjoyed just by the co-opted leaders, and even when rents are shared with followers, they are not likely to be shared with the followers of other parties. Thus, if we find that personal cooptation of the systemic opposition has no effect on protest by the ideologically proximate nonsystemic opposition, this will be consistent with the notion that spoil distribution, not policy concessions, are reducing protest.

COOPTATION: MEASUREMENT AND HYPOTHESES

To measure personal cooptation, we look at the allocation of legislative leadership positions to opposition politicians. In the United States, committee chairmanships provide their occupants with special opportunities to secure perks and pork for their districts (Fenno 1973). In Russian legislatures, committee chairmen and vice speakers are also of higher status, playing the key role in guiding legislation and allocating patronage opportunities (Remington 2001). Hence, we classify speakerships, vice-speakerships, and committee chairmanships as leadership positions. Original data on the partisan distribution of leadership positions in Russian regional legislatures was collected by the authors for the period between 2007 and 2012.

The KPRF received a leadership position after 61 of the 161 regional elections (38%) for which data is available between 2007 and 2012. In 43 of the 61 convocations where they received a leadership position, the KPRF received only one leadership position. In 27% of cases, they received only a committee chairmanship, and in 7% of cases they received only a vice-speakership. These leadership positions are almost invariably awarded to the top leadership of the KPRF in the region and are usually awarded to the party's faction leader. In the period under study, the ruling United Russia Party (UR) held all speakership positions.⁵

Our main independent variable is *KPRFLeadership*, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the KPRF holds any leadership position in a given month. We expect there to be fewer KPRF protests in regions where the KPRF holds a leadership position. It seems likely, however, that not all leadership positions are equally valuable. If our argument

about personal cooptation is correct, then we would expect access to more valuable leadership positions to have a larger effect on protest than less valuable ones. In order to test this, we use two additional measures of legislative cooptation. The first is a dummy variable equal to one if the KPRF holds a vice-speakership position, *KPRFViceSpeakership*. Vice-speakership positions are scarcer than committee chairmanships and, in most cases, more important, providing higher status and better lobbying opportunities.⁶ Vice-speakers are also responsible for coordinating the work of multiple committees and carrying out the duties of the speaker in his/her absence. In addition, compared to committee chairmanships, these positions come with higher salary, more staff, larger office space, and other perks, such as a driver and expense account. Thus, *KPRFViceSpeakership* should reduce protest more than *KPRFLeadership*.

We also develop a measure that allows us to identify the more important committee assignments and determine whether KPRF protest is further reduced when the KPRF receives a high-profile committee assignment. Judging the relative importance of these committee assignments is difficult. In US state legislatures, the most important committee assignments are usually the rules committee and the budget committee (Overby and Kazee 2000). There is no equivalent of the rules committee in Russian legislatures, as the role of the rules committee is taken up by the "council" of the legislature which typically includes the speaker, vice speakers, select committee chairmen, and legislative faction leaders. The budget committee does exist in Russian legislatures, and most observers agree that it is the most important committee in regional legislatures. Indeed, it is so important that United Russia almost never shares this position with the opposition, and the KPRF has not held budget committee chairmanship in any regional legislature elected since 2003.

However, the fact that UR never shares this important committee chairmanship points toward a coding scheme for assessing the relative importance of committee assignments. In order to assess the importance of committee chairmanships, we calculate the percent of committee chairmanships in a given policy area that are shared with the opposition across all convocations elected since 2003. Committee chairmanships in policy areas that are retained by UR more often are deemed more important. For example, United Russia retained the chairmanship of the Land committee for its members in 91% of convocations elected since 2003,

5. In 95% of the convocations elected between 2003 and 2012, United Russia held a majority of seats. There is no requirement that the majority party to share leadership positions with minority parties.

6. The average number of vice speakership positions in a regional legislature is 3.8, while the average number of committee chairmanships is 7.7.

but only kept the Tourism committee for itself in 73% of cases. According to this coding scheme, the Land committee is more important than the Tourism committee.⁷ Using this scheme, we create a variable, called *Committee Importance*, that is equal to the proportion of committee chairmanships in that policy area that are held by United Russia across all convocations in the country. This coding scheme is then applied to the policy area of the committee chairmanship held by the KPRF in a given convocation. Thus, returning to the above example, the KPRF received the Land committee in Stavropol Krai after the December 2011 elections, so *Committee Importance* is equal to 91 for that convocation. Among those convocations where the KPRF has a committee chairmanship, we expect *Committee Importance* to reduce KPRF protests.

Committee chairmanships differ not only in their salience, but also in the *type* of legislative influence they confer on their occupants. One important difference is the extent to which a particular committee provides opportunities for rent seeking and crafting private-regarding policies. For example, the chairman of the property committee may use this position to draft privatization laws that benefit his business interests. By contrast, the chairman of a committee on youth politics and civil society may have the opportunity to influence policy in these areas, but she or he has fewer opportunities to use his or her leadership position to craft particularistic policies that benefit a narrow group.

If our arguments about the importance of personal cooptation and the salience of private benefits are correct, then we would expect committees that offer significant opportunities for rent seeking to be more valuable to opposition politicians. In turn, when the KPRF holds committee chairmanships that provide such rent-seeking opportunities, we expect there to be fewer KPRF protests. To test this hypothesis, we create a variable called *Rents Committee* that is equal to one if the KPRF holds a committee chairmanship in a policy area that creates special opportunities for crafting particularistic policy aimed at business. These committees are construction, agriculture, economics, industry, property, natural resources, ecology, land, or taxes.⁸ When the KPRF holds a *Rents Committee*, levels of protest should be reduced by more than when the KPRF holds a regular leadership position.

7. Further details on this coding scheme are presented in the online supplementary appendix.

8. *Rents Committee* was coded as zero for veterans affairs, healthcare, labor, culture, tourism, local self-government, public safety, constitutional legislation, science, and social organizations. For details of coding, see the online supplementary appendix.

One notable feature of these measures is that the decision to distribute leadership positions among opposition parties is only partially determined by the electoral strength of those opposition parties. If the share of leadership positions received by the KPRF were a mechanical function of its vote share, then we could not separate the effect of personal cooptation on protest from the effect of the opposition's latent electoral strength. However, in a bivariate logistic regression of *KPRF Leadership* on the share of legislative seats held by the KPRF, the pseudo-R-squared is only .06 (the two variables are correlated at $r = .37$), so while the KPRF is more likely to hold a leadership position when it has a larger legislative fraction, other factors explain the majority of variation in the decision to grant leadership positions to the KPRF.

While the effects of personal cooptation on the in-system opposition are straightforward, the effect on other groups will depend on whether leadership positions are used to extract personal rents or to make public policy. If appointments are used as a platform for improving policy, then appointing Communists to important positions should also reduce protest on the part of nonsystem groups who share their policy goals. On the other hand, if, as we suspect, the benefits are primarily in the form of personal rents, we would expect that none of the measures of personal cooptation will reduce protest on the part of ideologically proximate nonsystem groups. Indeed, there may even be some tendency toward a defection of radicals to the nonsystemic opposition when the systemic leadership is coopted, so we might observe some increase in nonsystem protest when KPRF leaders are given prominent positions.

Examining the effect of personal cooptation of KPRF leaders on nonsystem protest also helps us check for a certain type of endogeneity bias. If the distribution of leadership positions to the KPRF were correlated with omitted variables that cause lower generalized levels of protest, then our results would be biased. However, if we find that personal cooptation of KPRF leaders only reduces protest by the KPRF, and not by nonsystem parties, then we can be more confident that the results are not affected by omitted variable bias.

Dependent Variable

To analyze the protest activity of the in-system opposition, we use data on protests organized by Russia's principal in-system opposition party, the KPRF. The KPRF long has had an ambiguous relationship with the Putin regime. On the one hand, the party wages a bitter rhetorical contest with the ruling authorities and represents the principal electoral challenge to the ruling party. On the other hand, the KPRF

also cooperates with the regime in certain spheres. Most notably, it participates in formal legislative decision-making bodies at both the national and subnational level, thereby helping to legitimate them. As the December 2011 protests showed, the KPRF also moderates its opposition when necessary and often refrains from cooperating with other opposition groups. In this way, the KPRF is central to the operation of the system.

Our data on KPRF protests comes from the KPRF official website, which publishes systematic news reports that cover KPRF protest activities. We analyzed these news reports and compiled a dataset that records information on the KPRF's protest activities in Russia's 83 regions from July 2007 through July 2012. The database contains data on 3898 protest events along different dimensions—date, type of event (strikes, hunger strikes, marches, demonstrations etc.), location (region, town, and place), type of participants, number of participants, nature of the demands made, and duration. Using this data, we create a simple count variable that is equal to the number of KPRF protest events that occur in a region in a given month. We include all events whatever the nature of the demands made since our theory applies just as much to how regional political actors respond to national events as to regional political issues.

For data on protest by nonsystem groups, we compiled monthly event counts from the opposition website (ikd.ru). The Institute of Collective Action (IKD) is a group of sociologists who compile weekly reports of protest actions in Russia. The website covers actions reported by IKD correspondents and newspapers throughout the Russian Federation. Detailed information on each event is presented in the “news wire” (*lenta novostei*) section of the website. These text reports were compiled into quantitative event data using the same procedure as for the KPRF data, resulting in information on 5,726 events. While the KPRF and the IKD gather data on politically proximate groups, the politics of a divided opposition mean that the event data from the two sources are quite different. The IKD focuses on smaller, grassroots organizations that rarely have a formal voice in the political process and does not collect data on KPRF events unless other nonKPRF activists are also involved in a particular event.

While no single data source can be a definitive record of all nonsystem opposition activities, the focus of the IKD provides us with a particularly good test of our theory of cooptation. First, IKD seeks to unite different social groups which it describes as “without a voice” in Russia's political institutions—in other words, nonsystem groups. Second, there is considerable ideological overlap between the KPRF and the leftist groups, labor unions, and environmental and

youth organizations that appear in the IKD data. In translating ideology into action, there is considerable overlap too. As we show in the appendix, the groups have similar distributions of demands, focusing on material issues, wages, and labor rights. Few events are based on nationalist or ethnic claims. Where the agenda differed, the differences tended to be produced by the in-system/nonsystem divide. Moreover, narrowing the definition of IKD protest events to exclude those areas where demands differ—i.e., civil rights and environmental protests—does not alter the results (for details, see the online supplementary appendix). This overlap of agendas should help us separate out the effects of policy and particularistic forms of cooptation.

Alternative Explanations and Controls

A key alternative mechanism that might connect legislatures to protest levels is the extent to which the opposition parties are able to gain seats in the legislature. In addition to the personal cooptation of leaders, parties that enjoy access to seats in the legislature, even in the absence of the policy concessions that underpin representation theories of cooptation, will have to tread a fine line between opposing the government enough to please their base, while moderating their challenge enough to retain the (regime-granted) privilege of access to the system.

While we outlined clear expectations about the effect of personal cooptation on KPRF protest, expectations about the effect of party seat shares on levels of in-system protest are more ambiguous. On one hand, coopted parties should conduct their business more within the institutions than on the streets, leading to a reduction in protest on the part of these groups. However, the number of legislative seats that the systemic opposition receives will also be determined by its electoral strength, assuming elections are not completely falsified. Regions where the KPRF has significant voter support may have higher levels of KPRF protest. This means that we cannot draw strong conclusions about the effect of legislative seats on in-system parties.⁹ By contrast, we do have expectations about the effect of more KPRF seats on non-system protest. We expect that when the systemic opposition has a larger role in official politics, more resources will be

9. The inclusion of this control also helps guard against another kind of endogeneity bias. If for some reason, more KPRF seats reduce KPRF protest, then controlling for KPRF seat share helps to ensure that the estimate of *KPRFLeadership's* effect on *KPRFProtest* is not confounded by KPRF seat shares. However, it seems more likely that where the KPRF is stronger we will see more protest (the two variables are in fact positively correlated). Importantly, if this dynamic is at play, it will bias against our finding that KPRF leadership has a negative impact on protest. For a fuller treatment of endogeneity issues, see the online supplementary appendix.

drawn into this part of the opposition and away from groups outside of the system. Hence, we expect that there will be fewer protests by the nonsystem opposition the more legislative seats the in-system opposition holds. We measure the share of seats in the regional assembly occupied by the KPRF using the variable *KPRFMandateShare*.

We also control for several competing explanations of protest. First, in line with both grievance and business cycle models of protest, we control for *Lagged Unemployment*. Second, we control for factors that could affect the ability of system and nonsystem oppositions to engage in collective action, such as *Press Freedom* and levels of *Urbanization*. *Press Freedom* is measured using the Glasnost' Defense Foundation's classification of regions based upon their monthly monitoring of threats against journalists and other challenges to the freedom of the press in Russia's regions. Consequently, while it focuses on press freedom in particular, this measure is a good general proxy for variations in the level of repression across the regions.¹⁰

Third, we control for the share of a region's economic output that is due to natural resource extraction and mining, *Natural Resources*. Regional governments with access to rent revenues have more fungible resources that they can use to buy support, so protest may be lower in these regions. Fourth, we control for the ethnic makeup of the region, *Percent Russian*. Russia's ethnic republics are, for a number of reasons, more repressive, so this measure may act as a proxy for repression. We also control for *Log Population*, since larger regions will have more protests, we include a dummy variable for the two capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg, and we control for the level of economic development in the region, *LogGRP/Capita*.

MODELING STRATEGY AND RESULTS

Our dataset contains 4,980 region-month observations stretching from July 2007 through September 2012. We construct two dependent variables using the protest data described above. The first dependent variable is a count that registers the number of KPRF protests taking place in a region in a given legislative convocation (Table 1) or month (Table 2). The second dependent variable is a count that registers the number of nonsystem protest events identified by IKD in a given legislative convocation (Table 1) or month (Table 2).

We use negative binomial models to account for the discrete, nonnegative nature of the dependent variable and because it models directly overdispersion (contagion) in the

observed counts, which is a typical feature of protest data (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984) and is present in our data. To account for unit effects, we include random effects parameters in all models. Since our key variables of interest either change slowly across time or not at all (i.e., the number of leadership positions held by the KPRF is often constant across time), we use random effects, as opposed to fixed effects.¹¹ Consequently, one shortcoming of our analyses is that they do not permit us to determine whether KPRF leaders are rewarded for low levels of protest or whether they are punished for high levels of protest. Unfortunately, because only 17 regions experience changes in the number of leadership positions that the KPRF holds between 2007 and 2012, it is difficult for us to disentangle these two perspectives. However, whether KPRF leaders are rewarded for good behavior or punished for bad, personal cooptation still works to reduce protest by providing opposition leaders with strong incentives to make sure that their followers stay off the streets.

We take a first cut at the data by aggregating our monthly observations within parliamentary convocations. While this method does not allow us to examine protest dynamics in detail, it is useful in illustrating the effects of interest at the aggregate level. Taking a parliamentary convocation as the unit of analysis gives us 158 observations across 82 regions. In models 1–4 (Table 1), we examine the total number of KPRF protest events taking place in a region during a particular parliamentary convocation, and in models 5 and 6, we consider the total number of IKD protest events. For ease of interpretation, we present incidence ratios (exponentiated negative binomial coefficients) that represent factor changes in the dependent variable for a one-unit increase in the independent variable.¹²

The results in models 1–4 show clear evidence in support of our arguments about personal cooptation. As expected, having a KPRF parliamentarian in a leadership position (Model 1), or as vice-speaker (Model 2) is associated with substantially lower levels of KPRF protests—about 15% less in the case of any leadership position and 25% less in the

11. In the appendix, we show that using fixed effects does not substantially affect the results.

12. Exponentiated negative binomial coefficients (also known as incidence rate ratios) can be interpreted as the ratio of the expected number of events when the predictor variable is equal to x to the expected number of events when the predictor variable is equal to $x+1$ (i.e., a one-unit increase). For example, in the case of a dichotomous regressor, an IRR of .85 indicates that the expected number of events when the predictor variable is 0 is 85% (15% lower) of the expected number of events when the predictor variable is equal to 1.

10. <http://www.gdf.ru/map/> (accessed March 17, 2014).

Table 1. Random Effect Negative Binomial Models of KPRF and Nonsystem Protest—Sums by Regional Legislative Convocations

	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: Nonsystem Protest	DV: Nonsystem Protest
	1	2	3	4	5
KPRF MandateShare	1.01 (1.335)	1.01 (1.384)	1.01 (1.185)	0.99 (-1.312)	1.00 (0.211)
KPRF Leadership	0.85 (-1.665)			1.42* (2.070)	
KPRF ViceSpeakership		0.75* (-2.467)			1.38* (2.941)
KPRF Rents Committee			0.66* (-3.609)		
Log Population	1.64* (6.342)	1.64* (6.216)	1.70* (6.787)	3.21* (8.099)	3.14* (7.971)
Log GRP/capita	0.66 (-1.940)	0.65* (-1.965)	0.73 (-1.420)	0.59 (-1.257)	0.73 (-0.768)
Urbanization	1.00 (0.163)	1.00 (0.297)	1.00 (0.277)	1.03* (2.119)	1.02 (1.840)
Percent Russian	1.01* (2.168)	1.01* (2.354)	1.01* (2.134)	1.01 (1.704)	1.01 (1.271)
Lagged Unemployment	0.96* (-2.476)	0.96* (-2.472)	0.96* (-2.412)	1.03 (1.352)	1.03 (1.487)
Press Freedom	1.03 (0.332)	1.02 (0.231)	1.01 (0.108)	1.11 (0.645)	1.17 (0.933)
Natural Resources	1.01 (0.879)	1.01 (0.845)	1.00 (0.278)	1.01 (0.355)	1.00 (0.069)
Moscow/St. Petersburg	3.34* (2.244)	4.08* (2.529)	3.50* (2.363)	12.12* (2.410)	11.94* (2.516)
Election Date	1.00* (3.365)	1.00* (3.826)	1.00* (3.998)	1.06* (16.919)	1.06* (17.073)
Length of Convocation	1.04* (16.291)	1.04* (17.073)	1.04* (17.458)	1.00 (-1.911)	1.00* (-3.063)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156
Number of regions	81	81	81	81	81
Log Likelihood	-549.9	-548.4	-545.0	-505.3	-503.4

Note—Cell entries are incidence rate ratios. Z-statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$

case of the vice-speakership.¹³ Moreover, committees that offer special opportunities for rent seeking have an even larger impact. When the KPRF holds a *RentsCommittee*, the incidence of protest is reduced by 34%.

By contrast, there is little evidence that personal co-optation of KPRF leaders has an effect on protest events held by ideologically proximate nonsystem oppositionists. In fact,

there is some evidence of a potential displacement effect in these specifications, as it appears that coopting KPRF leaders actually increases protest by the nonsystemic opposition, though this effect is not robust to the monthly models in Table 2 or in most of the robustness checks presented in the appendix. This lends support to the view that the main benefits of legislative leadership positions are personal rents, not policy influence. The difference in the two results also increases our confidence that the decision to distribute leadership posts to the KPRF is not simply correlated with

13. The effect of a leadership position in Model 1 is significant at $p < 0.1$.

Table 2. Random Effect Negative Binomial Models of Monthly Protest

	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: Nonsystem Protest	DV: Nonsystem Protest
	1	2	3	4	5	6
KPRF MandateShare	1.00 (0.353)	1.00 (0.041)	1.00 (-0.197)	1.03* (2.276)	0.98* (-1.965)	0.98* (-2.188)
KPRF Leadership	0.84* (-2.307)				0.97 (-0.300)	
KPRF ViceSpeakership		0.78* (-3.246)				0.93 (-0.832)
KPRF Rents Committee Committee Importance			0.72* (-4.025)	0.99 (-1.670)		
Log Population	1.65* (7.429)	1.65* (7.211)	1.69* (7.778)	1.35* (2.632)	2.32* (6.829)	2.31* (6.788)
Log GRP/capita	0.75 (-1.583)	0.72 (-1.732)	0.78 (-1.361)	1.03 (0.110)	0.22* (-5.822)	0.22* (-5.958)
Urbanization	1.01 (1.085)	1.01 (1.277)	1.01 (1.249)	1.00 (-0.115)	1.02* (2.626)	1.02* (2.647)
Percent Russian	1.01* (2.196)	1.01* (2.268)	1.01* (2.278)	1.01 (1.607)	1.01 (1.316)	1.01 (1.409)
Lagged Unemployment	0.98 (-1.631)	0.98 (-1.577)	0.98 (-1.487)	1.00 (-0.111)	0.98 (-1.401)	0.98 (-1.425)
Press Freedom	0.89* (-2.366)	0.88* (-2.494)	0.88* (-2.517)	0.90 (-1.107)	1.05 (0.823)	1.05 (0.778)
Natural Resources	1.00 (-0.139)	1.00 (-0.015)	1.00 (-0.468)	0.99 (-1.004)	1.05* (5.474)	1.06* (5.580)
Moscow/St. Petersburg	1.82 (1.173)	1.99 (1.286)	1.79 (1.141)	3.29* (2.074)	0.73 (-0.377)	0.80 (-0.268)
May Holidays	1.63* (7.840)	1.62* (7.776)	1.62* (7.832)	1.82* (5.456)	0.91 (-1.189)	0.91 (-1.224)
High Summer	1.03 (0.607)	1.03 (0.494)	1.03 (0.485)	1.16 (1.470)	0.68* (-5.915)	0.68* (-5.944)
Fall Protest Season	1.11* (1.968)	1.11 (1.904)	1.11 (1.924)	1.30* (2.784)	1.13* (2.213)	1.13* (2.199)
Two Months Before 2007 Election	0.80* (-2.023)	0.79* (-2.119)	0.80* (-2.063)	0.81 (-1.127)	0.55* (-5.181)	0.54* (-5.285)
December 2007	1.67* (4.134)	1.64* (3.988)	1.66* (4.091)	1.88* (2.851)	0.57* (-3.126)	0.56* (-3.171)
Between 2007_8Elections	0.46* (-4.885)	0.46* (-4.932)	0.46* (-4.967)	0.48* (-2.516)	0.84 (-1.445)	0.84 (-1.447)
March 2008	0.39* (-3.894)	0.38* (-3.939)	0.39* (-3.949)	0.55 (-1.658)	0.67* (-2.259)	0.67* (-2.269)
Two Months After 2008 Elections	1.05 (0.535)	1.05 (0.462)	1.04 (0.414)	1.16 (0.890)	0.89 (-0.956)	0.89 (-0.966)
Two Months Before 2011 Election	1.23* (2.482)	1.24* (2.598)	1.24* (2.538)	1.23 (1.455)	0.43* (-6.436)	0.43* (-6.412)

Table 2. (Continued)

	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: KPRF Protest	DV: Nonsystem Protest	DV: Nonsystem Protest
	1	2	3	4	5	6
December 2011	2.28* (8.453)	2.31* (8.595)	2.31* (8.600)	2.00* (3.581)	0.82 (-1.233)	0.83 (-1.189)
Between 2011_2Elections	1.40* (3.757)	1.42* (3.926)	1.42* (3.932)	1.45* (2.270)	0.66* (-3.273)	0.66* (-3.218)
March 2012 Elections	1.16 (1.087)	1.17 (1.188)	1.17 (1.200)	0.72 (-1.051)	0.14* (-5.571)	0.14* (-5.556)
Two Months After 2012 Elections	0.96 (-0.368)	0.98 (-0.219)	0.98 (-0.246)	0.98 (-0.127)	-	-
Lagged Dependent Variable	1.07* (5.237)	1.07* (4.922)	1.07* (4.848)	1.01 (0.322)	1.04* (4.237)	1.04* (4.287)
Observations	4,864	4,864	4,864	1,565	4,378	4,378
Number of regions	81	81	81	35	81	81
Log Likelihood	-5182	-5179	-5177	-1614	-4344	-4344

Note—Cell entries are incidence rate ratios. Z-statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$

some unobserved variable that is reducing levels of protest generally.

The convocation-level analysis shows the basic relationship between personal cooptation and protest. However, by lumping together our disaggregated protest data into convocation totals, we throw away important information on the dynamics of protest, including the effects of prior protest levels and time effects. Consequently, in Table 2, we present analyses using monthly protest event counts. The models include a full set of control variables, but in addition we parameterize dynamic effects by including a lagged dependent variable and a series of time dummies to control for time-specific shocks.¹⁴ Specifically, we take into account the effect of the annual May national holidays that are often a focus for political protest, the traditional low period in July and August when protest levels typically fall and the fall protest season of September through November (Robertson 2011). In addition, we consider the effects of national election periods—taking the pre-election period, the month of elections, the month after elections, and the period between the national duma and presidential elections.¹⁵

14. There are inferential problems associated with including a lagged dependent variable in specifications that include slowly changing independent variables. For this reason, we also show all monthly models in the appendix without the lagged dependent variable.

15. In the online supplementary appendix, we show that diffusion effects are minimal.

Models 1–4 in Table 2 present the results of the models of *KPRF Protest*, and models 5 and 6 show the results of the models of nonsystem protest. Again, the results consistently show that coopting KPRF leaders through appointment to leadership positions in regional parliaments reduces KPRF-organized protest. Model 1 shows the effect of *KPRFLeadership* on the number of protests occurring in a region-month.¹⁶ The coefficient indicates that when the KPRF holds a leadership position in a regional legislature the number of protests in a given month is reduced by 16%. This is a substantively important effect, meaning that, on average, regions where the KPRF holds a leadership position should have 1.56 fewer KPRF protests over the course of the year.¹⁷ Model 2 shows that giving the KPRF the high-profile position of vice-speaker has a larger dampening effect on KPRF-led protest than just coopting KPRF leaders with any leadership position—holding a vice-speakership reduces KPRF-led protest by 22%.

However, our theory is that cooptation is effective not because individual opposition figures are granted broad-based policy influence, but because these figures are bought

16. In some models, *KPRFMandateShare* has a positive impact on KPRF protest, but this effect is not consistent across models. Importantly, this variable is not more significant when *KPRFLeadership* is dropped, indicating that the two are not so highly correlated that the effect of *KPRFMandateShare* is being picked up by *KPRFLeadership*.

17. The mean number of KPRF protests per year is 9.48.

off with rent-seeking opportunities. We test this implication of our theory with monthly data in Model 3. As the coefficient on *RentsCommittee* indicates, protest is reduced even further in regions where the KPRF holds a committee that provides significant opportunities for rent seeking. Whereas the rate of protest is reduced by 16% in regions where the KPRF holds any leadership position, the rate of protest is reduced by 33% in regions where the KPRF holds a committee chairmanship that offers significant opportunities for rent seeking.¹⁸ This indicates that cooptation works best when opposition leaders are provided access to rents in the legislature.

In Model 4, we restrict the analysis to convocations where the KPRF held a committee chairmanship. We then look to see whether protest is lower in those region-months where the KPRF holds a more salient committee portfolio. This turns out to be the case—increasing *Committee Importance* from the least important to the most important committee held by the KPRF decreases KPRF protest by 32%.¹⁹ Taken together, Models 1–4 indicate that personal cooptation works. KPRF protest is lower when KPRF leaders receive leadership positions in Russia’s regional parliaments. Our confidence in this finding is bolstered by the fact that more important leadership positions seem to reduce protest even further.

As with the convocation totals, the monthly data also support the notion that buying-off Communist elites does nothing to reduce protest on the part of the nonsystem opposition. Models 5 and 6 show no effect of either a KPRF leadership position in general or the vice-speakership in particular, providing further support for the argument that the effects we find on KPRF protest are due to access to rents and not policy change. If protest were reduced as a result of policy concessions, then we would expect that protest would be reduced by ideologically proximate groups. This is not the case.

In contrast to personal cooptation, however, the share of KPRF seats in the legislature does seem to have some effect on nonsystem protest. In both model 5 and model 6, a one standard-deviation increase (5.8 percentage points) in the

18. In a model that only examines convocations where the KPRF holds a leadership position, the coefficient on *RentsCommittee* is negative and statistically significant. Thus, the effect of holding a *RentsCommittee* is statistically distinguishable from the effect of holding a regular leadership position. See the online supplementary appendix.

19. There are insufficient observations to induce convergence in convocation sum models that are restricted only to convocations where the KPRF holds a committee chairmanship. Thus, models using the *CommitteeImportance* variable are only included in the monthly models in Table 2. The effect of *CommitteeImportance* in Model 4 is significant at $p < 0.1$.

KPRF’s seat share reduces nonsystem protest by around 12%. Indeed, the models in Table 2 supports the notion that allowing the system opposition to win legislative seats reduces protest among the nonsystem opposition, although this effect was not found in the convocation models (Table 1).

Table 2 also provides insight into time dynamics. Communists, as most observers of Russian politics would expect, are fonder than the nonsystem opposition of Soviet era holidays such as May Day (May 1) and Victory Day (May 9). The July–August holidays seem to have a little effect, while the traditional “hot autumns” of Russian politics (September–November) are reflected in both system and nonsystem protest events. In terms of election cycles, we again see interesting differences between in-system and nonsystem protesters. Nonsystem protest levels are lower during elections, at least in terms of numbers of protest events. Whether this is due to resources and energy being drawn to in-system parties or whether it is due to a rejection of the elections as an opportunity for political expression is unclear. By contrast, election cycles have typically had a positive effect on KPRF protest activity. This is consistent with data on the kinds of demands made at protest events (see the online supplementary appendix). KPRF protesters were very active in the month of the Duma elections in 2007, though much less active during the presidential election. This pattern was repeated in the 2011–12 election cycle in which the KPRF was much more active around the Duma elections than around the presidential elections, despite their leader being on the presidential ballot.

The results on the controls across Tables 1 and 2 are of interest as well. Some of the control variable results are as expected. Both in-system and nonsystem protest is more common in more populous regions and in regions with a larger ethnic Russian population. However, most of the control variables—wealth, natural resources, urbanization, unemployment—do little to explain protest patterns, although Communists appear to be more active in less democratic regions. Overall, as in other studies of Russian protest (Robertson 2011), socio-structural factors seem to do less well at predicting protest than political factors.

CONCLUSION

Most modern autocrats govern in the presence of legislatures. The role of these parliaments, however, is poorly understood. In contrast to representation theories of cooptation, which focus on how legislatures facilitate policy concessions to the opposition, we have focused on how individual opposition leaders can be coopted with rents and particularistic benefits in legislatures. We find that opposi-

tion leaders who receive such particularistic benefits refrain from mobilizing their followers against the regime on the streets, providing some of the first direct evidence linking legislative cooptation to reduced social protest in authoritarian regimes.

Our argument also examined legislative cooptation in the context of a divided opposition. Most modern authoritarian regimes ban some opposition, while allowing other parts of the opposition to participate within regime-sanctioned institutions. We argued that while we would expect personal cooptation to have a substantial effect on the groups whose leadership is directly coopted, the effects on the nonsystem opposition were less obvious. Moreover, we found the effects on protest of coopting elites through leadership positions to be more consistent than the effects of simply allowing opposition parties to win seats in the legislature.

These results shed light on how authoritarian regimes negotiate with and coopt opposition in the contemporary world. Rents matter more than policy concessions in cooptation. This is consistent with the notion that protest in authoritarian regimes is heavily influenced by elite politics. In such an environment, coopting protest is as much about coopting leaders as it is about satisfying popular desires and needs. However, our analysis also suggests the limits of buying off leaders, since the effects of this form of cooptation seem limited to the specific groups whose leaders are rewarded. The findings presented here, of course, are just a first step in unpacking how authoritarian institutions have an effect on protest and political stability. Nevertheless, the results do suggest some clear directions for further research.

While we gained analytical leverage by limiting the study to one country and two sets of opposition groups, the particularities of the case also raise issues of what would change as the theory travels. There are at least two issues that will affect the scope conditions of the theory that we outlined. First is the nature of the authoritarian regime in question. We looked at a case of a hybrid regime in which real, even vigorous, opposition is permitted in the legislature, but we expect our theory to have analogues in other types of regimes as well. In single-party regimes, or unelected legislatures, positions of power within the legislature might still be used to influence the level of protest since buying off powerful elites with their own organizational capacity, even if it is not in the form of a political party, ought to have similar effects to the ones we demonstrate here.

Second is the question of how different kinds of oppositions are likely to behave. In our theory, we expected that buying off the leaders of opposition groups would reduce protest on the part of those groups. We illustrated this by looking at the highly institutionalized, hierarchical, and

well-disciplined KPRF. These two elements—the degree of institutionalization and discipline of the party—are likely to be variables that affect the size of the effect of personal cooptation on protest as well as the extent to which cooptation causes potential protesters to shift allegiance to other more independent groups.

Finally, we have focused in this article on institutions in authoritarian regimes. However, ruling parties also share legislative leadership positions with smaller parties in democracies (Martin and Vanberg 2011). What the similarities and differences in patterns of appointments across regimes types is an important question for future research. There are a number of dimensions along which we might expect the two to differ. In the authoritarian case, we have suggested that legislative leadership appointments are less a recognition of minority-party electoral success, as they would be in a democracy, and more a manifestation of in-tralite bargaining. Consequently, we would not expect (and do not find) positions to be awarded in strict proportion to electoral support. Moreover, while in democracies the sharing of positions with minority parties seems to be associated with policy concessions to those parties, our evidence suggests that in the authoritarian context concessions are more about sharing private access to rents than about granting influence over policymaking.

REFERENCES

- Blaydes Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles, and Milan Svolik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships." *Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 300–16.
- Fenno, Richard. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (11): 1279–1301.
- Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches. 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship." *Econometrica* 52 (4): 909–38.
- Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 715–41.
- Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding vs Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 482–502.
- Manion, Melanie. 2013. "Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China." CDDRL Working Paper, No. 128.
- Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2011. *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82: 1212–41.
- Overby, Marvin, and Thomas Kazee. 2000. "Outlying Committee in the Statehouse: An Examination of the Prevalence of Committee Outliers in State Legislatures." *Journal of Politics* 62 (3): 701–28.
- Remington, Thomas. 2001. *The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989–1999*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Reuter, Ora John. 2014. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia*. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. Unpublished manuscript.
- Reuter, Ora John, and Rostislav Turovsky. N.d. "Dominant Party Rule and Legislative Leadership in Authoritarian Regimes" *Party Politics*. Forthcoming.
- Robertson, Graeme B. 2011. *The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress." *Journal of Political Economy* 96 (1): 132–63.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 322–43.
- Wright, Joseph, and Abel Escriba-Folch. 2012. "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (2): 283–309.