

Comparative Authoritarianism

POLS 975
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Spring 2014
Time: Tuesday 4:00pm-6:40pm

Professor: Ora John Reuter
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Email: reutero@uwm.edu
Office Hours: Wednesday 2-4pm (or by
appointment)
Mode of Delivery: In-person

Course Description:

This is a graduate level course on the comparative politics of authoritarian regimes. Historically, most of the world's political regimes have been authoritarian. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic countries have come to outnumber those with authoritarian forms of government; but 40% of the world's governments remain authoritarian, and over half of the planet's population lives under non-democratic rule. Any effort to understand the foundations comparative politics would be incomplete without a consideration of non-democratic regimes.

We will begin the course by investigating conceptual and operational differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes. The course then proceeds to examine the question of 'who governs' in authoritarian regimes. We will look at conceptual distinctions between and empirical examples of personalist, monarchical, military, and single party regimes. The course then moves to consider the means by which authoritarian governments maintain and exercise their power. We will examine issues related to ideology, coercion, cooptation, electoral manipulation, patronage distribution, and political socialization. We will also look at how authoritarian governments manage relations with opposition forces and elites. Most of our focus will be on the political dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes, although we will also review the workings of authoritarian regimes from decades past in order to contextualize our discussions.

Although the primary focus of our course is not on democratic transitions, we will be vigilant in identifying the ways that the study of authoritarian rule can inform the study of democratization processes. In addition, your paper assignment will address this issue. Our approach to the material will be thematic. So we will not spend a great deal of time exploring the histories and details of particular cases, but our readings include empirical material from countries in all regions of the world.

Course Objectives:

In this course you will:

1. gain a firm understanding of the difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes
2. become familiar with the different types of authoritarian rule
3. learn about how authoritarian governments exercise and perpetuate their power
4. use the analytic toolkit of social science to examine why we observe certain political outcomes in authoritarian regimes
5. encounter and work through successful examples of applied political science research
6. learn to critique cutting edge research in comparative politics
7. gain exposure to sophisticated methodologies

Requirements:

1) Attend class sessions and participate

The format of this class will be discussion. Your participation includes both attendance and engagement in class discussion.

Most of our class time will be spent discussing the themes and arguments presented in our readings. Everyone should have something to say in every class. Your comments need not dazzle every time. Often times, the most productive contributions to class discussions are questions. If you don't understand something in the readings, say so. The authors we read are not perfect; one of our primary mandates in the course is to find flaws in these readings and discuss ways to improve them. Speak up and air your grievances. We will all be better for it and you will be rewarded come evaluation time. For each reading you should be prepared to discuss the following questions (if applicable):

- What is the research question? (i.e. what is the goal of the researcher?)
- Is this research question important? What is the puzzle being addressed? What is the motivation? (i.e. why was this paper written? Should we care about it?)
- What are the main concepts being discussed? Are they clear?
- What is the argument? What are its component parts? Who are the actors? Is it logically coherent? Is it novel?
- What are the observable implications of the argument?
- How is the argument tested? (i.e. what is the empirical strategy)
- How does the author measure key concepts? Are these measurements valid? Reliable?
- Does the evidence support the theory?
- What are the major hurdles to causal (or descriptive) inference in the empirical section (if applicable)? How does the author address these issues? Do they do an adequate job?

Attendance is mandatory. Our class is small, and therefore, you cannot free ride on your fellow classmates. Your absences will be noticed by all and have a palpable impact on our sessions. Each unexcused absence will result in the reduction of your participation grade by 1/3 of a letter grade.

2) Complete assigned readings before the date indicated on the syllabus

In order to participate effectively in discussion, you will need to have done the required readings for that day. Much is expected in terms of reading, but you are up to the task.

3) Seven 2-4 page reaction papers/presentation

Over the course of the semester, you will write seven reaction papers on a reading (or readings) of your choice from a class session.

These papers should have three components:

1) The paper should briefly (one paragraph) sum up the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.

2) It should contain an evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does his evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that

undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.

3) The paper should conclude with some questions for the class that flow from your evaluation/critique.

You will give a short 5-minute presentation on your paper to kick off our discussion of that reading. Your questions should help us in our discussion.

Each week we will determine who will write reaction papers for the following week. I will ask for volunteers.

The reaction papers are due in class on the day we discuss the reading.

4) Students will write one substantial (20-30 page) research design paper.

In this paper, you will propose original research on a topic related to the politics of authoritarian regimes. The aim of the research design is to help you learn how to write a publishable research paper in political science. It should contain all the elements of a journal-quality academic article, except the evidence itself. The research design should accomplish the following tasks.

- 1) Specify an interesting and important research question.
- 2) Justify the research question in light of existing literature and/or conventional wisdom. What is the relevant literature and/or research program that this question addresses? Many of your papers will be motivated by some "puzzle." A social scientific puzzle is a manifestation of a political phenomenon (a case, set of data, observation, or example) that is puzzling in light of intuition, existing literature, or existing empirical results. Puzzles push social scientific inquiry forward. Identifying interesting puzzles is one of the most difficult tasks in all of social science. It requires creativity and an awareness of your sub-field's overarching goals. It's really hard. Practice is the best way to learn how to do it.
- 3) Articulate a theoretical argument to help answer the research question.
- 4) Describe the empirical implications of the argument. That is, derive hypotheses from the argument.
- 5) Delineate alternative explanations and what we would expect to see in the data if they are true
- 6) Set forth a plan for testing these hypotheses. What will the dependent variable be? Independent variables? How will you address problems of inference?

Each of you should meet individually with me about your paper topic before September 28. A two page outline is due on October 12. The final version of the paper will be due by email on December 16

5) Complete one take-home final exam. Due by email on December 20.

Evaluation Scheme:

Class Attendance and Participation: 20%
Reaction Papers: 25%
Research Paper: 40%
Final Exam: 15%

Late Assignment Policy

All assignments are due on the assigned date. Response papers are due on the day that a reading is covered in class. I do not accept late assignments. Exceptions are made only in the most severe and extraordinary circumstances.

Required Texts for Purchase:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York: Cambridge

Expected Time Commitment:

This is a three-credit course, so the expected time commitment from students is approximately 144 hours. Students will spend 36 hours in class over the course of the semester. Approximately 50% of the remaining time will be spent preparing for class by doing assigned readings and taking notes. 10% will be spent preparing reaction papers. A further 40% will be spent working on the final research design paper.

Academic Honesty:

All assignments and activities associated with this course must be performed in accordance with the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's academic misconduct policy. Plagiarism will not be tolerated in this course and any plagiarism on any assignment will result in a failing grade for the course. *When in doubt, cite.* If you have questions about attribution, please see me. I am here to help! More information is available at http://www.uwm.edu/acad_aff/policy/academicmisconduct.cfm

University Policies (<http://www4.uwm.edu/secu/SyllabusLinks.pdf>)

September 7— Introduction and Concepts Democracy: authoritarianism's modern rival. Are citizens capable of governing themselves? What is liberty? When is democracy consolidated? How do we know an authoritarian regime when we see one? Is there such a thing as a hybrid regime?

Required:

Dahl, Robert. 1991. *Democracy and its Critics*. Chapter 4-7, pp53-106. [D2L]

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge pg 10-40. [D2L]

Dahl, Robert. 1972. *Polyarchy*. pp1-9 [D2L]

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 76(6): 22-43.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 1, p 3-20 [D2L]

Suggested:

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Chapter 21, pp250-256 and Chapter 22, pp 269-273

Held, David. 1987. *Models of Democracy*. pp71-89

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. "The Imperatives of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15, 2: 17-31.

Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Introduction and Chapters 1-7, 10-22, 24, 28-31.

Locke, John, *Second Treatise of Government*. Chapters 1-19.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1958 [1969]. Two concepts of liberty. *Four Essays on Liberty*

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value" *Journal of Democracy*. 10, 3. pp3-17.

Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy. *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (1):5-34.

Roessler, Philip and Marc Howard. 2011 "Post-Cold War Political Regimes" in Lindberg, Staffan ed., *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Chapter 4, pp 101-127

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*. 2(3): 75-88

Hale, Henry. 2010. "Eurasian Politics as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin's Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1(1).

Schedler, Andreas. 2010 "Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense" *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 69-80

"Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited" 2009. Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. *Public Choice*.

Coppedge Michael and John Gerring. 2011. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach." *Perspectives on Politics*.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. "Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13(2).

September 14 – Personalist and Military Regimes—What is traditional authority? Charismatic authority? Dynasties. The foundations of personal rule. Succession. How does a military regime differ from other types of authoritarian regimes? Do military leaders have preferences that are unique from normal politicians? Are military regimes different from personalist regimes? Why are there so few military regimes in the world today? Regime type and regime longevity.

Required:

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 5.
[D2L]

Powell, Jonathan. 2012. "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'Etat. 2012. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 56(6)

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* 59(4): 595-638.

Menaldo, Victor. 2012. "The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs" *Journal of Politics*. 74.3

Suggested:

Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Chapter 1 pp3-30
[D2L]

Herb, Michael. 1999. *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. [Selections]

H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. 1998. "A Theory of Sultanism: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule." In *Sultanistic Regimes*, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. pp 2-25

Weber, Max. 1958. "The three types of legitimate rule". *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 4 (1): 1-11.

Gorlizki, Yoram and Khlevniuk, Oleg. 2006. "Stalin and his circle." In Ronald G. Suny, editor, *The Cambridge history of Russia*, Volume 3, pages 243–267. New York: Cambridge

Crystal, Jill. 1989. "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar." *Comparative Politics* 21(4): 427-443.

Kapuschinski, Ryszard. 1983 *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*.

Belkin, Aaron and Evan Schofer. 2003. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 47(5):

Biglaiser, Glen. 2002. *Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin America*. Chapters 1-3 (pp. 1-90).

Debs, Alexandre. 2012. "Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and Out of Dictatorships" Working Paper. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=114070>

Wright, Thomas C. 2001 "The Antirevolutionary Military Regimes" in Wright, Thomas C. 2001. *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*. Westport: Praeger.

Stepan, Alfred. 1989. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. pp3-29.

Samuel Decalo. 1973. "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11(1): 105-127.

Barros, Robert J. 2002. *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (Chapter 2).

September 21—Single Party Dictatorships: Is "institutionalized dictatorship" an oxymoron? Ruling parties. How does a ruling party in an authoritarian regime differ from a political party in a democracy? Why do parties exist in some regimes and not others? Variation in ruling party institutions. Parties as constraints on dictators. Elite cohesion. Are party regimes more long-lived than others? Rule by concession?

Required:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4): 715-741.

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 6.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "The Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single party Rule" *World Politics* 57(3)

Reuter, Ora John. 2017. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia* New York: Cambridge UP [Selections] [D2L]

Suggested:

"The Party Goes On in China" *The Economist*. 28 May 2009

Castaneda, Jorge. 2001. *Perpetuating Power: How Mexico's Presidents Were Chosen*. Introduction and pp 1-61.

Langston, Joy. 2002. "Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime." *Latin American Politics and Society*. 44(3).

Voslensky, Mikhail. 1984. *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class*. 1-4, 14-111

Brownlee, Remainder

Huntington, Samuel. 1970. "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems." in Huntington, Samuel and Clement Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*.

September 28—Ideology and Mass Mobilization--Totalitarianism. Does ideology matter? Revolutionary regimes. The erosion of ideology in modern autocracies. Public opinion. The role of the media.

Required:

Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes" *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression" *American Political Science Review*

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2013 "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes" *Journal of Democracy*. 24(3)

Linz, Juan. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Chapter 2 [D2L] pp 65-114

Wedeen, Lisa. 1998. "Acting 'As If': Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3): 503-523

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989)
Article can be accessed here <http://www.wesjones.com/coh.htm>

Suggested:

Reuter, Ora John and David Szakonyi. 2014. "Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes" *British Journal of Political Science*.

Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia" Forthcoming. *American Economic Review*. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v101y2011i7p3253-85.html>

Schatz, Edward. 2009. "The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan." *Comparative Politics*. 41(2).

Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1965. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Introduction.

Kasza, Gregory. 1995 *The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations*. Selections

October 5—Repression –Why do authoritarian regimes coerce? Do some coerce more than others? Why?

Required:

Greitens, Sheena. 2016. *Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

Khlevniuk, Oleg. 1995. "The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938," in Hoffmann, David. *Stalinism. Essential Readings*. [D2L]

Kung, James Kai-Sing and Shuo Chen. 2011. "The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine" *American Political Science Review*

Eva Bellin. 2005. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, pp. 21-41 [D2L]

Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization." *Comparative Politics*.

Suggested:

Chiot, Daniel. 1996. *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age*.

Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II. 2004. "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976-1996" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 538-554.

October 12—Institutions and Social Cooptation Is "institutionalized dictatorship" an oxymoron? Policy concessions. Spoil sharing. Power sharing. Do dictatorships with institutions survive longer? Why do some dictatorships create such institutions? Is some form of representation and accountability possible under authoritarianism?

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, Princeton University Press pp. 3-41.

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*, 104(3): pp482-502.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships" *Economics and Politics*

Boix, Carles and Milan Svobik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships." *Journal of Politics*

Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson. 2015. "Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes" *Journal of Politics*

Suggested:

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2):322-43.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Selections

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2013. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism" *British Journal of Political Science*.

October 19—Elections— Why do authoritarian leaders hold elections? Elections as precursors to democratization? Elections as mechanisms of authoritarian rule?

Required:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York. Cambridge Introduction [Selections]

Blaydes, Lisa. 2008. "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt" Working Paper. Available Online:
<http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf>

Lust-Okar E. 2009. "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition..* [D2L]

Teorell, Jan and Axel Hadenius. 2009. "Elections as Levers of Democratization" in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition..* [D2L]

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2015. "Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." *Comparative Politics* [D2L]

Suggested:

Brownlee, Jason. 2010. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions" *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(3).

Hale, Henry. 2005. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics*. 58(1): 133-165.

October 26- Patronage and Redistribution How do authoritarian leaders use state resources to appease citizens and social groups? Are they different from democracies in this sense? What factors inhibit their ability to gain privileged access to state resources? Performance legitimacy. The role of

economic growth. Do natural resources undermine democracy? How autocrats use natural resources to their advantage.

Required:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 1, 3, 4 [Selections]

Wallace, Jeremy. 2013. "Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival" *Journal of Politics*.

Albertus, Michael. 2013. "Explaining Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy: The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above" *Latin American Research Review*.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*.

Suggested:

Greene, Kenneth. 2010. "The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance" *Comparative Political Studies*.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women" *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-123.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2010. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse" *American Political Science Review*. 105(1).

Ross, Michael and Jorgen Juel Andersen. 2014. "The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis" *Comparative Political Studies*

Jones-Luong, Pauline and Erica Weintal. 2010. *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

November 16— Political Machines and Clientelism Vote-buying vs. turnout buying. Is vote-buying undemocratic? Brokers. Patron-client relations.

Required:

Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review*, 102 (01), 19-31.

Stokes, Susan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99 August 315-325.

Hale, Henry. 2014. *Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge [Selections]

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China" *American Political Science Review*

Suggested:

Schedler, Andreas. 2006. "What Is Vote Buying?" *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. F.C. Schaffer (Lynne Rienner) [D2L]

Oliveros, Virginia. 2014. "Public Employees as Political Workers: Evidence from an Original Survey in Argentina." Ms. New York: Columbia University. April. 1-39.

Hale, Henry. 2003. "Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions: Economy, Ethnicity, and Legacy." *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 19(3).

Reuter, Ora John. 2013. "Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia" *Post-Soviet Affairs*.

Ocantos, Exequiel Gonzalez, Chad Kiewet de Jonge, and David Nickerson. 2014. "The Conditionality of Vote Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America" *American Journal of Political Science*. 58(1).

November 9—No class (date uncertain)

November 2-- Electoral Intimidation and Electoral Fraud-- Why use electoral fraud? Why not? How do we detect electoral fraud? Electoral intimidation and its causes.

Required:

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections*. New York: Cambridge. Selections on [D2L]

Svolik, Milan and Ashlea Rundlett. 2016. "Deliver the Vote: Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud" *American Political Science Review*

Hyde, Susan D. 2007. —The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. *World Politics* 60 (1):37-63.

Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2014. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace" *World Politics*.

Gaventa, John. 1982. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. [Selections] [D2L]

Suggested:

Enikolopov, Ruben, Vasily Korovkin, Maria Petrova, Konstantin Sonin, and Alexei Zakharov. 2013 "Field Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian Parliamentary Elections" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110(2)

Emily Beaulieu and Susan Hyde. 2009. "In The Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts" *Comparative Political Studies*. 42(3).

Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2003. "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences" *Annual Review of Political Science* 6

November 23—Thanksgiving Break

November 30--- Opposition and Protest— What is the role of opposition in authoritarian regimes? How is it different from the role of the opposition in democracies? Can the opposition win? How? When do regimes permit the oppositions to organize? Opposition coalitions. Coordination problems. Social unrest. How do dictators manage protest? When is it successful? What are its causes?

Required:

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2004. "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition" *Comparative Politics*. 36(2): 159-179

Howard, Marc Morje, and Philip Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 365-81.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York. Cambridge. Chapter 2 pp73-76, Chapter 7

Timur Kuran, 1991 "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44(1): 7-48

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (2): 259-76.

Suggested:

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2006. "Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce" In Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*.

Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik. 2010. "Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes" *World Politics*. 62(1).

Beissinger, Mark. 2013. "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *American Political Science Review*.

Joshua A. Tucker, 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud Collective Action Problems and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5(3): 535-551

December 7-Economic Development—Does autocracy hinder economic development? What are its effects on public goods provision? Property Rights. Accountability. Credible Commitment. How does regime type affect the foreign policy behavior of leaders?

Required:

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3):

North, Douglas and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History*.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. —Political Regimes and Economic Growth. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (3): pgs 51-60

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development." *American Economic Review*. 91:5 1369-1401.

Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies *Economia*, Fall 2002. 41-109.

[D2L]

Xu, Chenggang. 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development" *Journal of Economic Literature*

Suggested:

Ross, Michael L. 2006. Is Democracy Good for the Poor. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4)

Baum, Matthew, and David A. Lake. 2003. —The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital. *American Journal of Political Science* 4(2): 333-47.

Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” *Journal of Economic Growth*, September, 2004

Scott Abramson and Carles Boix. 2012. The Roots of the Industrial Revolution: Political Institutions or (Socially Embedded) Know-How? Working Paper. Princeton University. Available online at: http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/online-community/historical-theoretical-pe/Abramson_Boix_v1.pdf

Brown, David S., and Wendy Hunter. 1999. —Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980-92 *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 779-90.

Brown, David S., and Wendy Hunter. 2004. —Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin America 1980 to 1997. *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (7): 842-64.

Kaufman, Robert R. and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. 2001. —Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis 1973-1997, *World Politics* 53 : 553-587.

Stasavage, David. 2005. —Democracy and Education Spending in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2): 343-58.

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