

Comparative Authoritarianism

POLS 975
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Spring 2021
Time: Tuesday 3:00pm-5:40pm

Professor: Ora John Reuter
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Email: reutero@uwm.edu
Office Hours: By Appointment
Mode of Delivery: In-person

Course Description:

This is a graduate level course on the comparative politics of authoritarian regimes. Historically, most of the world's political regimes have been authoritarian. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic countries have come to outnumber those with authoritarian forms of government; but 40% of the world's governments remain authoritarian, and over half of the planet's population lives under non-democratic rule. Any effort to understand the foundations comparative politics would be incomplete without a consideration of non-democratic regimes.

We will begin the course by investigating conceptual and operational differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes. The course then proceeds to examine the question of 'who governs' in authoritarian regimes. The course then moves to consider the means by which authoritarian governments maintain and exercise their power. We will examine issues related to ideology, coercion, cooptation, electoral manipulation, patronage distribution, and political socialization. We will also look at how authoritarian governments manage relations with opposition forces and elites. Most of our focus will be on the political dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes, although we will also review the workings of authoritarian regimes from decades past in order to contextualize our discussions.

Although the primary focus of our course is not on democratic transitions, we will be vigilant in identifying the ways that the study of authoritarian rule can inform the study of democratization processes. In addition, your paper assignment will address this issue. Our approach to the material will be thematic. So we will not spend a great deal of time exploring the histories and details of particular cases, but our readings include empirical material from countries in all regions of the world.

Course Objectives:

In this course you will:

1. gain a firm understanding of the difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes
2. become familiar with the different types of authoritarian rule
3. learn about how authoritarian governments exercise and perpetuate their power
4. use the analytic toolkit of social science to examine why we observe certain political outcomes in authoritarian regimes
5. encounter and work through successful examples of applied political science research
6. learn to critique cutting edge research in comparative politics
7. gain exposure to sophisticated methodologies

Requirements:

1) Attend class sessions and participate

The format of this class will be discussion. Your participation includes both attendance and engagement in class discussion.

Most of our class time will be spent discussing the themes and arguments presented in our readings. Everyone should have something to say in every class. Your comments need not dazzle every time. Often times, the most productive contributions to class discussions are questions. If you don't understand something in the readings, say so. The authors we read are not perfect; one of our primary mandates in the course is to find flaws in these readings and discuss ways to improve them. Speak up and air your grievances. We will all be better for it and you will be rewarded come evaluation time. For each reading you should be prepared to discuss the following questions (if applicable):

- What is the research question? (i.e. what is the goal of the researcher?)
- Is this research question important? What is the puzzle being addressed? What is the motivation? (i.e. why was this paper written? Should we care about it?)
- What are the main concepts being discussed? Are they clear?
- What is the argument? What are its component parts? Who are the actors? Is it logically coherent? Is it novel?
- What are the observable implications of the argument?
- How is the argument tested? (i.e. what is the empirical strategy)
- How does the author measure key concepts? Are these measurements valid? Reliable?
- Does the evidence support the theory?
- What are the major hurdles to causal (or descriptive) inference in the empirical section (if applicable)? How does the author address these issues? Do they do an adequate job?

Attendance is mandatory. Our class is small, and therefore, you cannot free ride on your fellow classmates. Your absences will be noticed by all and have a palpable impact on our sessions. Each unexcused absence will result in the reduction of your participation grade by 1/3 of a letter grade.

2) Complete assigned readings before the date indicated on the syllabus

In order to participate effectively in discussion, you will need to have done the required readings for that day. Much is expected in terms of reading, but you are up to the task.

3) Seven 2-4 page reaction papers/presentation

Over the course of the semester, you will write seven reaction papers on a reading (or readings) of your choice from a class session.

These papers should have three components:

1) The paper should briefly (one paragraph) sum up the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.

2) It should contain an evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does his evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that

undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.

3) The paper should conclude with some questions for the class that flow from your evaluation/critique.

You will give a short 5-minute presentation on your paper to kick off our discussion of that reading. Your questions should help us in our discussion.

Each week we will determine who will write reaction papers for the following week. I will ask for volunteers.

The reaction papers are due in class on the day we discuss the reading.

4) Students will write one substantial (20-30 page) research design paper.

In this paper, you will propose original research on a topic related to the politics of authoritarian regimes. The aim of the research design is to help you learn how to write a publishable research paper in political science. It should contain all the elements of a journal-quality academic article, except the evidence itself. The research design should accomplish the following tasks.

- 1) Specify an interesting and important research question.
- 2) Justify the research question in light of existing literature and/or conventional wisdom. What is the relevant literature and/or research program that this question addresses? Many of your papers will be motivated by some "puzzle." A social scientific puzzle is a manifestation of a political phenomenon (a case, set of data, observation, or example) that is puzzling in light of intuition, existing literature, or existing empirical results. Puzzles push social scientific inquiry forward. Identifying interesting puzzles is one of the most difficult tasks in all of social science. It requires creativity and an awareness of your sub-field's overarching goals. It's really hard. Practice is the best way to learn how to do it.
- 3) Articulate a theoretical argument to help answer the research question.
- 4) Describe the empirical implications of the argument. That is, derive hypotheses from the argument.
- 5) Delineate alternative explanations and what we would expect to see in the data if they are true
- 6) Set forth a plan for testing these hypotheses. What will the dependent variable be? Independent variables? How will you address problems of inference?

Each of you should meet individually with me about your paper topic before March 5. A one page outline is due on March 16. The final version of the paper will be due by email on May 23.

5) Complete one take-home final exam. Due by email on May 22.

Evaluation Scheme:

Class Attendance and Participation: 20%

Reaction Papers: 25%

Research Paper: 40%

Final Exam: 15%

Late Assignment Policy

All assignments are due on the assigned date. Response papers are due on the day that a reading is covered in class. I do not accept late assignments. Exceptions are made only in the most severe and extraordinary circumstances.

Expected Time Commitment:

This is a three-credit course, so the expected time commitment from students is approximately 144 hours. Students will spend 36 hours in class over the course of the semester. Approximately 50% of the remaining time will be spent preparing for class by doing assigned readings and taking notes. 10% will be spent preparing reaction papers. A further 40% will be spent working on the final research design paper.

Academic Honesty:

All assignments and activities associated with this course must be performed in accordance with the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's academic misconduct policy. Plagiarism will not be tolerated in this course and any plagiarism on any assignment will result in a failing grade for the course.

When in doubt, cite. If you have questions about attribution, please see me. I am here to help! More information is available at http://www.uwm.edu/acad_aff/policy/academicmisconduct.cfm

University Policies (<http://www4.uwm.edu/secu/SyllabusLinks.pdf>)

COVID-19 Policies and Accommodations:

Panther Community Health and Safety Standards

UWM has implemented reasonable health and safety protocols, taking into account recommendations by local, state and national public health authorities, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a member of our campus community you are expected to abide by the [Panther Community Health and Safety Standards](#) and the [Interim COVID-Related Health & Safety Rules \(SAAP 10-12\)](#), which were developed in accordance with public health guidelines. These standards apply to anyone who is physically present on campus, UWM grounds, or participating in a UWM-sponsored activity.

With respect to instructional spaces (classrooms, labs, performance spaces, etc.):

- Six-foot social distancing must always be maintained.
- Masks are always required on campus, with limited exceptions—environments where hazards exist that create a greater risk by wearing a mask (for example, when operating equipment in a lab with the risk of a mask strap getting caught in machinery, or when flammable materials are being used).
- A student who comes to class without wearing a mask will be asked to put on a mask or to leave to get one at a mask handout station. Failure to do so could result in student conduct processes.
- You should check daily for COVID symptoms by completing the self-check at <https://uwm.edu/coronavirus/symptom-monitor/>. Symptoms may appear 2-14 days after exposure to the virus and include fever, cough, or shortness of breath or difficulty breathing. See the [CDC's Website](#) for more information about COVID-19 symptoms.

Students who test positive for or who are diagnosed based on symptoms with COVID-19 should complete this Dean of Students form:

https://cm.maxient.com/reportingform.php?UnivofWisconsinMilwaukee&layout_id=4. By doing so, students will get information on resources, help UWM identify individuals they may have come into contact with on campus so that UWM can work with the local health department, and allow UWM to clean campus areas you visited as appropriate.

COVID Attendance Policy

Do not attend class if you have COVID-19, if you are experiencing symptoms consistent with COVID-19, if you have been in close contact with others who have symptoms, or if you need to care for an individual with COVID-19.

Students who miss class due to the above conditions will not be penalized for their absence and will not be asked to provide formal documentation from a healthcare provider.

If you are unable to attend class, take the following steps.

- Notify me in advance of the absence or inability to participate.
- Participate in class activities online and submit assignments electronically, to the extent possible.
- Reach out to me if illness will require late submission or other modifications to deadlines.
- If remaining in a class and fulfilling the necessary requirements becomes impossible due to illness or other COVID-related circumstances, contact me to discuss other options.

As your instructor, I will trust your word when you say you are ill, and in turn, I expect that you will report the reason for your absences truthfully.

Potential for Reversion to Fully Online Instruction

Changing public health circumstances for COVID-19 may cause UWM to move to fully online instruction at some point during the semester. UWM will communicate with students about moving to fully online instruction if the situation develops.

January 26— Introduction and Concepts Democracy: authoritarianism's modern rival. Are citizens capable of governing themselves? What is liberty? When is democracy consolidated? How do we know an authoritarian regime when we see one? Is there such a thing as a hybrid regime?

Required:

Dahl, Robert. 1991. *Democracy and its Critics*. Chapter 4-7, pp53-106. [CANVAS]

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge pg 10-40. [CANVAS]

Dahl, Robert. 1972. *Polyarchy*. pp1-9 [CANVAS]

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 76(6): 22-43.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 1, p 3-20 [CANVAS]

Suggested:

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Chapter 21, pp250-256 and Chapter 22, pp 269-273

Held, David. 1987. *Models of Democracy*. pp71-89

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. "The Imperatives of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15, 2: 17-31.

Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Introduction and Chapters 1-7, 10-22, 24, 28-31.

Locke, John, *Second Treatise of Government*. Chapters 1-19.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1958 [1969]. Two concepts of liberty. *Four Essays on Liberty*

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value" *Journal of Democracy*. 10, 3. pp3-17.

Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy. *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (1):5-34.

Roessler, Philip and Marc Howard. 2011 "Post-Cold War Political Regimes" in Lindberg, Staffan ed., *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Chapter 4, pp 101-127

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*. 2(3): 75-88

Hale, Henry. 2010. "Eurasian Politics as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin's Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1(1).

Schedler, Andreas. 2010 “Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense” *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 69-80

“Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited” 2009. Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. *Public Choice*.

Coppedge Michael and John Gerring. 2011. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach.” *Perspectives on Politics*.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13(2).

February 2 – The Role of the Military—How does a military regime differ from other types of authoritarian regimes? Do military leaders have preferences that are unique from normal politicians? Are military regimes different from personalist regimes? Why are there so few military regimes in the world today? Regime type and regime longevity.

Required:

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Chapter 1 pp3-30
[CANVAS]

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 5.
[CANVAS]

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work*, Chapter 3 [CANVAS].

Suggested:

Powell, Jonathan. 2012. “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’Etat. 2012. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 56(6)

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Belkin, Aaron and Evan Schofer. 2003. “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 47(5):

Biglaiser, Glen. 2002. *Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin America*. Chapters 1-3 (pp. 1-90).

Debs, Alexandre. 2012. "Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and Out of Dictatorships" Working Paper. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=114070>

Wright, Thomas C. 2001 "The Antirevolutionary Military Regimes" in Wright, Thomas C. 2001. *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*. Westport: Praeger.

Stepan, Alfred. 1989. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. pp3-29.

Samuel Decalo. 1973. "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11(1): 105-127.

February 9—Power Sharing and Its Absence-- Collective vs individual rule. Policy concessions. Spoil sharing. Succession. Power-sharing with allies. When do personalist regimes emerge? Personality cults.

Required:

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 3. [CANVAS]

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Selections [CANVAS]

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work*, Chapter 4 [CANVAS].

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* 59(4): 595-638.

Suggested:

Meng, Anne. 2020. *Constraining Dictatorship. From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes*. New York: Cambridge.

Herb, Michael. 1999. *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. [Selections]

H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. 1998. "A Theory of Sultanism: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule." In *Sultanistic Regimes*, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. pp 2-25

Weber, Max. 1958. "The three types of legitimate rule". *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 4 (1): 1-11.

Gorlizki, Yoram and Khlevniuk, Oleg. 2006. "Stalin and his circle." In Ronald G. Suny, editor, *The Cambridge history of Russia*, Volume 3, pages 243–267. New York: Cambridge

Crystal, Jill. 1989. "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar." *Comparative Politics* 21(4): 427-443.

Kapuschinski, Ryszard. 1983 *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*.

Menaldo, Victor. 2012. "The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs" *Journal of Politics*. 74.3

February 16—Political Parties and Legislatures: Is "institutionalized dictatorship" an oxymoron? Ruling parties. How does a ruling party in an authoritarian regime differ from a political party in a democracy? Why do parties exist in some regimes and not others? Variation in ruling party institutions. Parties as constraints on dictators. Elite cohesion. Are party regimes more long-lived than others? Rule by concession?

Required:

Reuter, Ora John. 2017. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia* New York: Cambridge UP Chapter 1, 3, 4 and 6 [CANVAS]

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 6.

Truex, Rory. 2014. "Returns to Office in a Rubber Stamp Parliament" *American Political Science Review*. 108(2).

Suggested:

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*, 104(3): pp482-502.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4): 715-741.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "The Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single party Rule" *World Politics* 57(3)

Castaneda, Jorge. 2001. *Perpetuating Power: How Mexico's Presidents Were Chosen*. Introduction and pp 1-61.

Langston, Joy. 2002. "Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime." *Latin American Politics and Society*. 44(3).

Voslensky, Mikhail. 1984. *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class*. 1-4, 14-111

Boix, Carles and Milan Svoblik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships." *Journal of Politics*

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2013. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism" *British Journal of Political Science*.

February 23—Ideology --Totalitarianism. Does ideology matter? Revolutionary regimes. The erosion of ideology in modern autocracies?

Required:

Linz, Juan. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Chapter 2 pp 65-114 [CANVAS]

Wedeen, Lisa. 1998. "Acting 'As If': Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3): 503-523

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2013 "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes" *Journal of Democracy*. 24(3)

Svoblik, Milan. 2020. "When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989)
Article can be accessed here <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>

Suggested:

Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1965. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Introduction.

March 2—Repression –Why do authoritarian regimes coerce? Do some coerce more than others? Why?

Required:

Greitens, Sheena. 2016. *Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections] [CANVAS]

Kung, James Kai-Sing and Shuo Chen. 2011. "The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine" *American Political Science Review*

Shen-Bayh, Fiona. "Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival." *World Politics* (2018): 1-37.

Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov. 2017. "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine" *Journal of Politics*.

Suggested:

Chiot, Daniel. 1996. *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age*.

Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II. 2004. "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976-1996" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 538-554.

Khlevniuk, Oleg. 1995. "The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938," in Hoffmann, David. *Stalinism. Essential Readings*.

Eva Bellin. 2005. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, pp. 21-41

Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization." *Comparative Politics*.

March 9—Propaganda, Censorship, and the Media—Controlling information. Why do autocrats use propaganda? Why allow some media freedom? New Media.

Required:

Carter, Brett and Erin Carter. 2020. *Autocratic Propaganda in Comparative Perspective*. Manuscript [CANVAS]

Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's Strategic Censorship" *American Journal of Political Science*.

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression" *American Political Science Review*

Rozenas, Arturas and Denis Stukal. 2018 "How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia's State Controlled Television" *Journal of Politics*.

Stukal, Denis, Sergey Sanovich, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua Tucker. 2020. Bots for Autocrats: How Pro-Government Bots Fight Opposition in Russia. Manuscript. New York University.
http://www.denisstukal.com/uploads/8/4/7/0/84708866/stukal_et_al__2020__bots_for_autocrats.pdf

Suggested:

Kasza, Gregory. 1995 *The Conscripted Society: Administered Mass Organizations*. Selections

Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes" *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347

Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia" Forthcoming. *American Economic Review*. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v101y2011i7p3253-85.html>

Schatz, Edward. 2009. "The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan." *Comparative Politics*. 41(2).

March 16—Coopting, Controlling and Incentivizing Agents –Keeping elites loyal. Defections. Elite power sharing. Patron-client relations. Managing elite allies. Principal-Agent problems. Loyalty-competence tradeoffs. Incentivizing good governance. Elite shuffling. Purges.

Required:

Reuter, Ora John and David Szakonyi. 2019. "Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia" *American Political Science Review*.

Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. "Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty Competence Tradeoff?" *Journal of the European Economic Association*.

Landry, Pierre, Xiaobo Lu, and Haiyan Duan. 2018 "Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder?" *Comparative Political Studies*

Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson 2011. "Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments" *Journal of Politics*.

Hassan, Mai. 2017. "The Strategic Shuffle: Ethnic Geography, the Internal Security Apparatus, and Elections in Kenya" *American Journal of Political Science*.

Suggested:

Hale, Henry. 2014. *Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* New York: Cambridge [Selections] [CANVAS]

Arriola, Leonardo. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa" *Comparative Political Studies*.

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China" *American Political Science Review*

March 30—Mass Support and Accountability Is some form of representation and accountability possible under authoritarianism? Legitimacy. Support for authoritarian leaders.

Required:

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Tresiman. 2019. "Informational Autocrats." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Tresiman. 2020. "The Popularity of Authoritarian Leaders: A Cross-national Investigation." *World Politics*.

Truex, Rory. 2017. "Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits" *Comparative Political Studies*.

Dimitrov, Martin. 2014. "What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a Barometer of Public Opinion in Communist Bulgaria" *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*.

Miller, Michael. 2015. "Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development" *Comparative Political Studies*

Recommended:

Dukalskis, Alexander and Johannes Gerschewski. 2017 "What Autocracies say (and what citizens hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation" *Contemporary Politics*.

April 6- Social Cooptation How do authoritarian leaders use state resources to appease citizens and social groups? Are they different from democracies in this sense? What factors inhibit their ability to gain privileged access to state resources? Do natural resources undermine democracy? How autocrats use natural resources to their advantage.

Required:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 1, 3, 4

Wallace, Jeremy. 2013. "Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival" *Journal of Politics*.

Albertus, Michael. 2013. "Explaining Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy: The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above" *Latin American Research Review*.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*.

Suggested:

Greene, Kenneth. 2010. "The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance" *Comparative Political Studies*.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women" *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-123.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2010. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? a Reappraisal of the Resource Curse" *American Political Science Review*. 105(1).

Ross, Michael and Jorgen Juel Andersen. 2014. "The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis" *Comparative Political Studies*

Jones-Luong, Pauline and Erica Weintal. 2010. *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

April 13: Rule of Law—Constitutions under dictatorship. The role of courts. Judicial independence.

Required:

Przeworski, Adam. 2013. "Ruling Against Rules" in Ginsburg, Thomas and Alberto Simpser (eds). 2013. *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes* New York: Cambridge.[CANVAS]

Ginsburg, Thomas and Tamir Moustafa. 2008. "Introduction: The Function of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes" In Ginsburg, Thomas and Tamir Moustafa. eds *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes* New York: Cambridge. [Available as an ebook through UWM library]

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy" *American Journal of Political Science*.

Wang, Yuhua. 2016. *Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China*. New York Cambridge Chapters 1 and 2. [CANVAS]

Suggested:

Barros, Robert J. 2002. *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (Chapter 2).

Moustafa, Tamir. 2008. "Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt" In Ginsburg, Thomas and Tamir Moustafa. eds *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes* New York: Cambridge [Available as an ebook through UWM library]

April 20—Elections— Why do authoritarian leaders hold elections? Elections as precursors to democratization? Elections as mechanisms of authoritarian rule?

Required:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York. Cambridge Introduction [CANVAS]

Blaydes, Lisa. 2008. "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt" Working Paper. Available Online:
<http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf>

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2015. "Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." *Comparative Politics*

Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Havard Nygard, and Tore Wig. 2017. "Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?" *World Politics*.

Lust-Okar, E. 2009. "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition..* [CANVAS]

Suggested:

Teorell, Jan and Axel Hadenius. 2009. "Elections as Levers of Democratization" in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition..* [CANVAS]

Brownlee, Jason. 2010. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions" *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(3).

Hale, Henry. 2005. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics*. 58(1): 133-165.

April 27-- Electoral Fraud-- Why use electoral fraud? Why not? How do we detect electoral fraud?

Required:

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections*. New York: Cambridge. Introduction. [CANVAS]

Svolik, Milan and Ashlea Rundlett. 2016. "Deliver the Vote: Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud" *American Political Science Review*

Reuter, Ora John and David Szakonyi. 2021. "Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia" *World Politics*.

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May 4— Vote Buying and Voter Intimidation Vote-buying vs. turnout buying. Is vote-buying undemocratic? Brokers. Electoral intimidation and its causes.

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Oliveros, Virginia. 2014. "Public Employees as Political Workers: Evidence from an Original Survey in Argentina." Ms. New York: Columbia University. April. 1-39.

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May 11--- Opposition— What is the role of opposition in authoritarian regimes? How is it different from the role of the opposition in democracies? Can the opposition win? How? When do regimes permit the oppositions to organize? Opposition coalitions. Coordination problems.

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