

# The Politics of Authoritarian Regimes

POL SCI 312 LEC 001  
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee  
Spring 2023  
TR 1:00-2:15  
Room: BOL B40

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Office Hours: Wednesday 1-3pm or by  
appointment  
Mode of Delivery: In-person

**Prerequisites:** Junior standing, Comparative Politics course

## Course Description:

It has been said that politics is the study of who gets what, when, where, and how. This course is an advanced introduction to the *politics* of authoritarian regimes. Historically, most of the world's political regimes have been authoritarian. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic countries have come to outnumber those with authoritarian forms of government; but 40% of the world's governments remain authoritarian, and over half of the planet's population lives under non-democratic rule. Any effort to understand the foundations comparative politics would be incomplete without a consideration of non-democratic regimes.

We will begin the course by investigating conceptual and operational differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes. We will then ask if those differences matter. The course then proceeds to examine the question of 'who governs' in authoritarian regimes. We will look at conceptual distinctions between and empirical examples of personalist, monarchical, military, and single party regimes. The course then moves to consider the means by which authoritarian governments maintain and exercise their power. We will examine issues related to ideology, coercion, cooptation, electoral manipulation, patronage distribution, and political socialization. We will also look at how authoritarian governments manage relations with opposition forces and elites. Most of our focus will be on the political dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes, although we will also review the workings of authoritarian regimes from decades past in order to contextualize our discussions.

Although the primary focus of our course is not on democratic transitions, we will be vigilant in identifying the ways that the study of authoritarian rule can inform the study of democratization processes. In addition, your paper assignment will address this issue. Our approach to the material will be thematic. So, we will not spend a great deal of time exploring the histories and details of particular cases, but our readings include empirical material from countries in all regions of the world.

## Course Objectives:

In this course you will:

1. gain a firm understanding of the difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes
2. become familiar with the different types of authoritarian rule
3. learn about how authoritarian governments exercise and perpetuate their power
4. gain exposure to several modern and historical cases of authoritarian government
5. gain useful 'real-world' knowledge about contemporary authoritarian regimes

6. use the analytic toolkit of social science to examine why we observe certain political outcomes in authoritarian regimes

### **Requirements:**

#### 1) Attend class sessions and participate

The format of this class will be discussion. Your participation includes both attendance and engagement in class discussion.

I will lecture at times, but most of our class time will be spent discussing the themes and arguments presented in our readings. Everyone should be ready to contribute something in every class. Your comments need not dazzle every time. Often times, the most productive contributions to class discussions are questions. If you don't understand something in the readings, say so. The authors we read are not perfect; their prose may not always be clear and their arguments will never be bulletproof. Speak up and air your grievances if you are confused. We will all be better for it and you will be rewarded come evaluation time.

Attendance is mandatory. Our class is small, and therefore, you cannot free ride on your fellow classmates. Your absences will be noticed by all and have a palpable impact on our sessions. Each unexcused absence will result in the reduction of your attendance grade by 1/3 of a letter grade. Absences will only be excused for documented illness, family crises, religious observances etc.

Late Policy: You are expected to arrive to class on time unless you have a valid excuse. It is disruptive and disrespectful to arrive to class late. If you are not present when I take roll at the beginning of class, you will be marked as absent for the day unless you have a documented excuse for your tardiness.

Your class participation grade will be based upon three equal components: 1/3 will be based on reading quizzes (see below), 1/3 will be based on participation in class, and 1/3 will be based on attendance.

#### 2) Complete assigned readings before the date indicated on the syllabus

In order to participate effectively in discussion, you will need to have done the required readings for that day. Much is expected in terms of reading, but you are up to the task.

On most weeks I will post on CANVAS a short list of questions that you should keep in mind while doing the readings. These questions will help facilitate discussion on a given reading. On some, but likely not all, class days we will begin class with a short quiz. These quizzes will contain one question drawn from that week's questions. Grades of "check" or "check-minus" and "unsatisfactory" will be assigned.

#### 3) One quiz: The Geography and History of Authoritarianism

No, this is not high school. But in order for you to engage knowledgeably with our material, it is important that you have a firm 'real-world' grasp of our subject matter. This early semester quiz will push you to acquire that grasp.

4) Two 2-4 page reaction papers/presentation

Over the course of the semester, you will write two reaction papers on a reading (or readings) of your choice from a class session.

These papers should have three components:

1) The paper should briefly (one paragraph) sum up the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.

2) It should contain an evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does his evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.

3) The paper should conclude with some questions for the class that flow from your evaluation/critique.

You will give a short 5-minute presentation on your paper to kick off our discussion of that reading. Your questions should help us in our discussion.

Each week we will determine who will write reaction papers for the following week. I will ask for volunteers.

All papers are due on the day that we cover the reading in class.

4) One Mid-Term Quiz—March 16

5) Prepare for and participate in our in-class debate--- May 4

For this debate, the class will be divided into four teams. In order to prepare for this debate you will be required to prepare a 1-page 'position paper' that lays out why you think the position you are defending is the correct one and why the opposition position is incorrect. This individual position paper is due by email on May 2. You will also be required to meet with your debate team once outside of class. More specific instructions will be distributed in the weeks prior to the debate.

6) One Final Paper

Your most important assignment in this class will be a 15-30 page research paper. In this paper, you will undertake original research on a topic within one of the following three themes:

1) How some aspect of authoritarian rule affects democratization or regime change. Aspects of authoritarian rule that we will examine in this class include the existence of ruling parties, the maintenance of legislatures, the role of the military, the use of elections, control of the media, repression, coercion, electoral fraud, political socialization, and patronage.

Authoritarian regimes vary along all of these dimensions. Under this theme, your paper would examine how one of these aspects affects regime change or democratization.

2) How some aspect of authoritarian rule affects policy or political outcomes (aside from democratization). Under this theme you might examine how one of these aspects affects the prevalence of protest or violence in authoritarian regimes. Or you might examine how it affects economic growth, development, social spending, or human rights.

3) The causes of some aspect of authoritarian rule. So, for example, you might ask: why do some authoritarian regimes have legislatures? Why do some regimes engage in electoral fraud? Why are elections held in some regimes, but not in others? The comparison set should be other authoritarian regimes.

The research paper should contain an argument and evidence for that argument. In February and March we will discuss the methods for writing a research paper in more detail. I will distribute an extensive list of example topics. **By March 13 at 3pm**, I will ask each of you email me your topic along with a preliminary outline. On April 20, you will be required to submit a written five-page progress report on your research (or paper draft), along with a list of sources. Both of these intermediary steps will be graded.

The full final version of the paper will be due by email on May 20.

### **Evaluation Scheme for Undergraduate Students:**

Class Attendance and Participation: 25%

Geography Quiz: 5%

Reaction Papers: 15%

Mid Term Quiz 15%

Debate Paper/Participation: 5%

Final Paper 35% (5% is based on topic and outline, 10% is based on progress report and 20% is based on final paper)

### **Late Assignment Policy**

All assignments are due on the assigned date. Response papers are due on the day that a reading is covered in class. I do not accept late assignments. Exceptions are made only in the most severe and extraordinary circumstances.

### **Required Texts for Purchase:**

Kapuscinski, Ryszard. 1983. *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*. London: Harcourt.

### **Other Readings:**

Other required readings can be accessed either through our CANVAS site (except for the graduate article readings which can be accessed through UWM libraries). The suggested readings are not required, but are listed for your own further study. See the exception for graduate students.

**Expected Time Commitment:**

This is a three-credit course, so the expected time commitment from students is approximately 144 hours. Students will spend 36 hours in class over the course of the semester. Approximately 50% of the remaining time will be spent preparing for class by doing assigned readings and reviewing previous lecture notes. A further 10% will be spent preparing for quizzes and exams. Students should expect to allocate the final 40% to writing response papers and their final paper.

**Academic Honesty:**

All assignments and activities associated with this course must be performed in accordance with the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's academic misconduct policy. Plagiarism will not be tolerated in this course and any plagiarism on any assignment will result in a failing grade for the course. *When in doubt, cite.* If you have questions about attribution, please see me. I am here to help! More information is available at [http://www.uwm.edu/acad\\_aff/policy/academicmisconduct.cfm](http://www.uwm.edu/acad_aff/policy/academicmisconduct.cfm)

## **PART I—WHAT IS AUTHORITARIANISM?**

### **January 24—Introduction and Overview**

**January 26—What is at stake?** The state. Liberty and equality. Guardianship. Are citizens capable of governing themselves? Do citizens know their own preferences?

Required:

Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. Chapter 4-5 (ONLY). No need to read Chapter 6-7 in PDF.

Suggested:

Held, David. 1987. *Models of Democracy*. pp71-89

Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Introduction and Chapters 1-7, 10-22, 24, 28-31.

Locke, John, *Second Treatise of Government*. Chapters 1-19.

**January 31—What is an authoritarian regime?** Concepts. Democracy: authoritarianism's modern rival.

Required:

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*. 2(3): 75-88

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 76(6): 22-43.

Suggested:

Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy*. Chapter 1-2, pp. 1-33

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. "The Imperatives of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15, 2: 17-31

**February 2—Geography, Facts, Trends, Data!** How do we know an authoritarian regime when we see one? Does it matter how we define democracy? Waves of democratization? Introduction to classifying authoritarian regime types. Geographic distribution of authoritarian regimes.

Required:

Skim/Review Main Points in Varieties of Democracy 2022 Annual Report (pp 6-37)

[https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr\\_2022.pdf](https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf)

Suggested:

Freedom House. Freedom in the World Annual Report.  
<https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>

“Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited” 2009. Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. *Public Choice*. Pp67-90

**February 7—Authoritarianism’s Consequences Part 1** Effects of authoritarian rule on economic outcomes. Economic Growth. Development. Property Rights. Credible Commitment.

Required:

Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567-576.

North, Douglas and Barry Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” *The Journal of Economic History*. pp 803-819 (Just skim 819-832 to understand the main effect of the Glorious revolution reforms. )

Suggested:

Baum, Matthew, and David A. Lake. 2003. —The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital. *American Journal of Political Science* 4(2): 333-47.

Ross, Michael L. 2006. —Is Democracy Good for the Poor. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4)

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. —Political Regimes and Economic Growth. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (3): 51-57.

**February 9—Authoritarianism’s Consequences Part 2** War and Conflict

In Class Quiz: Geography of Authoritarianism

Required:

Bruce Russett 1994. *Grasping the Democratic Peace* Chapters 1 and 2. pp 3-42

Suggested:

Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II. 2004. "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976-1996" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 538-554.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Chapter 1, pp1-92 and 460-61

Reiter, Dan and Alan Stam. 2003. *Democracies at War*. Chapter 2

Dube, Oeindrila, and S.P. Harish. "Queens. 2020." *Journal of Political Economy* 128(7): 2579–2652.

## **PART II: WHO GOVERNS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES?**

**February 14—Personalist Regimes** The foundations of one-person rule.

Required:

Kapuschinski, Ryszard. 1983 *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*. 1-100

Suggested:

H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. 1998. "A Theory of Sultanism: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule." In *Sultanistic Regimes*, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. pp 2-25

Gorlizki, Yoram and Khlevniuk, Oleg. 2006. "Stalin and his circle." In Ronald G. Suny, editor, *The Cambridge history of Russia*, Volume 3, pages 243–267. New York: Cambridge

Weber, Max. 1958. "The three types of legitimate rule". *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 4 (1): 1-11.



**February 16—Dynasties and Succession** Why do dictators hand power to family members?

Required:

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* 59(4): 595-638.

Suggested:

Menaldo, Victor. 2012. "The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs" *Journal of Politics*. 74.3

Herb, Michael. 1999. *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

**February 21: Writing a Research Paper:** Presentation by Professor Reuter

**February 23—Military Regimes Part 1** How does a military regime differ from other types of authoritarian regimes? Do military leaders have preferences that are unique from normal politicians? Are military regimes different from personalist regimes? Why are there so few military regimes in the world today?

Required:

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

Suggested:

Stepan, Alfred. 1989. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. pp3-29.

Biglaiser, Glen. 2002. *Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin America*. Chapters 1-3 (pp. 1-90).

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 5.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work*. Chapter 3.

**February 28—Military Regimes Part 2** Coups. Civil-military relations. Why are there so few military regimes in the world today?

Required:

Marquez, Xavier. 2017. *Non-Democratic Politics*. Chapter 6.

Quinlivan, James. 1999. "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security*. 24(2).

Suggested:

Cook, Steven. 2007. *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*

Wright, Thomas C. 2001 "The Antirevolutionary Military Regimes" in Wright, Thomas C. 2001. *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*. Westport: Praeger.

Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Chapter 1 pp3-30

Brooker, Paul. 2009. *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory Government and Politics*. Pp81-104

Paine, Jack. 2022. "Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators" *American Political Science Review*

**March 2—Institutionalized Dictatorships: Ruling Parties** Is "institutionalized dictatorship" an oxymoron? Ruling parties. How does a ruling party in an authoritarian regime differ from a political party in a democracy? Parties as constraints on dictators. Elite cohesion. Are party regimes more long-lived than others?

Required:

Reuter, Ora John. 2017. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia* [Selections] [CANVAS]

Suggested:

Reuter, Ora John and Thomas Remington. 2009. "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42(4).

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2011. *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

Langston, Joy. 2002. "Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime." *Latin American Politics and Society*. 44(3).

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 6.

Castaneda, Jorge. 2001. *Perpetuating Power: How Mexico's Presidents Were Chosen*. Introduction and pp 1-61.

Huntington, Samuel. 1970. "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems." in Huntington, Samuel and Clement Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "The Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single party Rule" *World Politics* 57(3)

Reuter, Ora John. 2022. "Why is Party-Based Autocracy More Durable? Examining the Role of Elite Institutions and Mass Organization" *Democratization*.

### **March 7: China: An Institutionalized Dictatorship**

#### Required:

"The Party Goes On in China" *The Economist*. 28 May 2009

Li, Cheng. 2010. China's communist party-state: The structure and dynamics of power. In William A. Joseph, editor, *Politics In China: An Introduction*, pages 165–191. New York: Oxford UP.

**March 9—Totalitarianism** Communism. Totalitarianism. State planning of the economy. Life under communism

#### Required:

Linz, Juan. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Chapter 2 pp66-100 ONLY

#### Suggested:

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America, and Post-Communist Europe*. pp 38-51

Chicot, Daniel. 1996. *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age*.

Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1965. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Introduction.

### **PART III: HOW DO AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES GOVERN?**

**March 14—Ideology and Legitimacy** Does ideology matter? Revolutionary regimes. The erosion of ideology in modern autocracies? How do autocrats justify their rule?

Required:

Wedeen, Lisa. 1998. "Acting 'As If': Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3): 503-523

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Treisman. 2022. *Spin Dictators*. Chapter 1.

Suggested:

Opalo, Ken Ochieng and Lahra Smith. 2021. "Ideology and Succession Politics in Ethiopia: Autocratic Leadership Turnover and Political Instability" *Democratization*.

"Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Durability." (with Steven Levitsky) *Perspectives on Politics* 10, No. 4 (2012): 869-889

Dukalskis, Alexander and Johannes Gerschewski. 2017 "What Autocracies say (and what citizens hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation" *Contemporary Politics*. Pg 1-10 ONLY

**March 16—Mid-Term Quiz**

**March 21 and March 23---Spring Break**

**MARCH 28-NO CLASS**

**March 30— Repression** Why do authoritarian regimes coerce? Do some coerce more than others? Why? Stalin's Great Terror.

Required:

McAuley, Mary. 1992. *Soviet Politics: 1917-1991*. Chapter 4

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Treisman. 2022. *Spin Dictators*. Chapter 2.

Suggested:

Eva Bellin. 2005. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, pp. 21-41

Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization." *Comparative Politics*.

Hoffmann *Stalinism. Essential Readings*. Oleg Khlevniuk, "The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938"

Greitens, Sheena. 2016. *Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. New York: Cambridge.

Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov. 2017. "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine" *Journal of Politics*.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2018. *State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton University Press.

**April 4—The Media and Censorship** Does the popularity of some authoritarian rulers legitimate their rule? How do authoritarians use the media to maintain social control?

Required:

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression" *American Political Science Review*

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Treisman. 2022. *Spin Dictators*. Chapter 4.

Suggested:

Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia" Forthcoming. *American Economic Review*. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v101y2011i7p3253-85.html>

Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's Strategic Censorship" *American Journal of Political Science*.

Adena, Maja, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130, no. 4 (2015): 1885–1939.

Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes" *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347

## April 6—No Class

**April 11—Propaganda** How do autocrats use their control of information to manipulate citizens? Hard vs soft propaganda. Can propaganda backfire?

### Required:

Rozenas, Arturas and Denis Stukal. 2018. "How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia's State Controlled Television." *Journal of Politics*.

Huang, Haifeng. 2018. "The Pathology of Hard Propaganda" *Journal of Politics*

### Suggested:

Carter, Brett and Erin Carter. 2023. *Propaganda in Autocracies: Institutions, Information, and the Politics of Belief* New York: Cambridge.

Mattingly, Daniel and Elaine Yao. 2022. "How Soft Propaganda Persuades" *Comparative Political Studies*.

**April 18---Mass support and Accountability** Is some form of representation and accountability possible under authoritarianism? Support for authoritarian leaders.

### Required:

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Tresiman. 2020. "The Popularity of Authoritarian Leaders: A Cross-national Investigation." *World Politics*.

Buckley, Noah, Kyle Marquardt, Ora John Reuter, and Katerina Tertytchnaya. 2023. "Endogenous Popularity: How Perceptions of Support Affect the Popularity of Authoritarian Leaders?" Working Paper [CANVAS]

Suggested:

Dimitrov, Martin. 2014. "What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a Barometer of Public Opinion in Communist Bulgaria" *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*.

Truex, Rory. 2017. "Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits" *Comparative Political Studies*.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York: Cambridge.

Miller, Michael. 2015. "Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development" *Comparative Political Studies*

Wallace, Jeremy. 2013. "Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival" *Journal of Politics*.

Albertus, Michael. 2013. "Explaining Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy: The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above" *Latin American Research Review*.

**April 20 — Natural Resources** How do authoritarian leaders use state resources to appease citizens and social groups? Are they different from democracies in this sense? The special role of oil and minerals.

Required:

Friedman, Thomas L. 2006. The first law of petropolitics. *Foreign Policy*, (154):28–36.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women" *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-123.

Suggested:

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*. 53(3): pp325-361.

Fish, M Steven. *Democracy Derailed in Russia*, Chapter 5

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge.

Jones-Luong, Pauline and Erica Weintal. 2010. *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

**April 25: Electoral Authoritarianism** Regimes that hold semi-competitive elections. What is a hybrid regime? The gray area between democracy and authoritarianism. Are these the only 'modern' form of non-democratic regime?

Required:

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 51-65.

Schedler, Andreas. 2010 "Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense" *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 69-80

Suggested:

Hale, Henry. 2010. "Eurasian Polities as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin's Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1(1).

Diamond, Larry. 2002. "Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13(2).

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York. Cambridge Introduction

**April 27—Authoritarian Elections** Why do authoritarian leaders hold elections? Elections as mechanisms of authoritarian rule? Elections and Information.

Required:

Lust, Okar. 2009. "Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East" *Journal of Democracy*

Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Havard Nygard, and Tore Wig. 2017. "Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?" *World Politics*.

Suggested:

Lust-Okar E. 2009. "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes in Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition..



Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson. 2012. "Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments" *Journal of Politics*. 74(4)

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2013. "Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." *Comparative Politics*

Hale, Henry. 2005. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics*. 58(1): 133-165.

Brownlee, Jason. 2010. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions" *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(3).

Teorell, Jan and Axel Hadenius. 2009. "Elections as Levers of Democratization" in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition..*

Przeworski, Adam, Gonzalo Rivero, and Tianyang Xi. 2015. "Elections as a Conflict Processing Mechanism." *European Journal of Political Economy*

**May 2—Vote Buying, Electoral Fraud, and Voter Coercion** Vote buying. Is vote-buying undemocratic? Why does vote-buying and voter coercion happen in some settings, but not others? Why use electoral fraud? Why not? How do we detect fraud?

Required:

Schedler, Andreas. 2006. "What Is Vote Buying?" *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. F.C. Schaffer (Lynne Rienner)

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 1. Pp1-33

Suggested:

Stokes, Susan. 2006. "Is Vote Buying Undemocratic?" *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. F.C. Schaffer (Lynne Rienner)

Stokes, Suan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99 August 315-325.

Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review*, 102 (01), 19-31.

Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2014. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace" *World Politics*

Reuter, Ora John and David Szakonyi. 2021. "Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia" *World Politics*.

Enikolopov, Ruben, Vasily Korovkin, Maria Petrova, Konstantin Sonin, and Alexei Zakharov. 2013 "Field Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian Parliamentary Elections" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110(2)

Svolik, Milan and Ashlea Rundlett. 2016. "Deliver the Vote: Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud" *American Political Science Review*

Higashijima, Masaaki. 2022. *The Dictators Dilemma at the Ballot Box*. University of Michigan Press.

Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewet de Jonge, Carlos Melendez, David Nickerson, and Javier Osorio. 2020. "Carrots and Sticks: Experimental Evidence of Vote Buying and Voter Intimidation in Guatemala." *Journal of Peace Research*.

#### **May 4**—In-Class Debate: The Future of Autocracy

**May 9**—**Opposition** Dilemmas of opposition under autocracy. How do opposition parties mobilize? How do they coordinate? Voting behavior of opposition supporters. Systemic and non-systemic oppositions.

#### Required:

Gandhi, Jennifer and Elvin Ong. 2019. "Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies" *American Journal of Political Science*.

Reuter, Ora John. 2021. "Civic Duty and Voting under Autocracy." *Journal of Politics*.

#### Suggested:

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**May 11—Protest and Revolution** When does protest break out in authoritarian regimes? When can it bring regimes down? Collective action problems.

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