

The Putin Coalition: Understanding the Bases of Regime Support During Wartime

Timothy Frye *

Henry Hale †

Ora John Reuter‡

Bryn Rosenfeld §

September 4, 2024

DRAFT: Not for Citation

*Columbia University

†George Washington University

‡University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

§Cornell University

1 Introduction

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the landscape of Russian politics. One consequence of the war was a surge in Vladimir Putin’s approval rating, similar in size to the rally-around-the-flag effect that accompanied the annexation of Crimea. In this paper, we examine the determinants of support for Putin and the composition of his support base using a nationally representative face-to-face panel survey that was carried out before and after the invasion of Ukraine. The first wave of this survey was carried out in September 2021, while the second was carried out near the end of December 2021, just two months before the invasion. A third wave of reinterviews was carried out in October 2023. With this data we are able to offer a systematic analysis of Putin’s support base during Russia’s new wartime reality and compare it with his support base before the war.

Drawing on the comparative politics literature, we examine various explanations of popular support for dictators. We find support for many of the key arguments in this literature. In December 2021, on the eve of war, support for Putin was associated with an admixture of economic performance evaluations, patriotic sentiment, ideological affinity, state dependence and media diet. Many of these factors remained relevant in 2023, but the broadening of his support coalition following the war led to a weakening of some of these relationships—especially on economic policy positions—as more politically disengaged individuals and those with left-imperialist views switched their support to Putin.

On the whole we find that Putin’s wartime coalition is not a social, ideological, or attitudinal monolith. It is a melange. Using Latent Class Analysis, we characterize the different attitudinal groupings that comprise Putin’s support base in 2023. We find that Putin’s support base is made up of three groups with distinctive belief structures: *Pro-Putin Liberals*, comprising 37% of Putin supporters, tend to oppose the war, have more pro-Western views, support market reforms, and prioritize economic issues. *Left-Imperialists* comprise 45% of Putin Supporters and are distinguished by their strongly pro-war stance, anti-Western foreign policy views, support for a socialist economic system and are more inclined to ethnonationalism. Finally, *Fairweather Friends*, who comprise 19% of the Putin supporters, hold amorphous political views and are more likely to be politically disengaged. Members of this group were far more likely to have rallied to support Putin after the war.

On the whole, our data give lie to the notion that Putin’s popularity is monocausal. It would be incorrect to argue, as some have, that Putin’s support base is rooted solely or even mostly in economic performance evaluations, nationalism, war fever, fear, social conformity, or a preference for autocracy. This is not a regime whose support base is rooted in a particular ethnic group, social or regional cleavage, ideology, or polarized identity group. Some of Putin’s support is deep-rooted, but much is not.

This diversity has several implications. First, the lack of a single, ideologically cohesive social base complicates regime efforts to polarize society around "us vs them" distinctions. And the fact that the regime draws on the support of different groups and ideologies can help explain why it sometimes pursues contradictory policies. During the war in Ukraine, the regime has pursued a seemingly schizophrenic strategy of both downplaying the war's significance (e.g. calling it a "special military operation" rather than a war) while simultaneously engaging in anti-Western agitation and nationalist mobilization. This may be linked to the broad set of constituencies that constitute the Putin coalition. A key question is whether this dual strategy can be successful, or if the contradictions are too great.

2 Theories of Popular Support for Dictators

With the global spread of public opinion polling in the late 20th century, it became apparent that many contemporary dictators were popular. This revelation flew in the face of the conventional wisdom that dictators ruled solely through fear (see Magaloni, 2006; Guriev and Treisman, 2019; Przeworski, 2023). Indeed, support for authoritarian leaders is often higher than for incumbents in democracies.¹ Russia's Vladimir Putin is a classic example of the popular dictator phenomenon: since coming to power in 2000 Putin's approval ratings have averaged near 70%, at times soaring above 80%.

Cases such as Putin's Russia have prompted scholars to study the sources of authoritarian popularity. Of course, in some autocracies, estimates of regime support may be significantly inflated because respondents are lying to pollsters about their support for the regime. This can happen because respondents fear political sanction for expressing opposition or because they feel pressure to conform with a prevailing social norm to support the authorities (e.g. Kuran, 1991). Some have argued that Putin's approval ratings in Russia are primarily attributable to such preference falsification (Yudin, 2022; Judah, 2013) And to be sure, scholars have found evidence of preference falsification in Russia and a range of other contemporary autocracies. But these same studies also find that most of the support evidenced in opinion polls appears genuine (e.g. Magaloni, 2006; Guriev and Treisman, 2020; Frye, Gehlbach, Marquardt and Reuter, 2017; Frye, Gehlbach, Marquardt and Reuter, 2023; Kalinin, 2016; Shen and Truex, 2021)²

In addition, support for dictators, even if genuine, is no doubt heavily influenced by the authoritarian nature of the system. Restrictions on the opposition, as well as censorship and government control of the media limit exposure to alternative points of view. Meanwhile

¹Using a global sample of opinion polls in democracies and autocracies Mauk (2020, 94) finds that popular support for authoritarian incumbents is higher than for their democratic counterparts.

²The literature reviewed below (and the results in this paper) uncover systematic patterns of social support for contemporary dictators. Such regularities are not consistent with the view that all or most of contemporary autocrats' approval ratings can be chalked up to preference falsification.

the propaganda on state media shapes how citizens view the government. Indeed, one of the oldest findings in the literature on authoritarian support is that those who are exposed to state media are more likely to support the regime (see Geddes and Zaller, 1989) And those who are more able to see through state propaganda, such as the educated are more likely to oppose the regime (Geddes and Zaller, 1989; Guriev and Treisman, 2019). In their cross-national study of dictatorial popularity, Guriev and Treisman (2020) find that leader support is significantly lower in countries with more press freedom. In Russia, studies demonstrate that state media consumption is a powerful predictor of regime support (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Shirikov, 2023) At the same time, propaganda is not all powerful, as evidenced by the wide array of political opinions—and indeed the large pockets of opposition—that exist in authoritarian regimes. The rise of alternative media has made it harder for governments to achieve centralized control over media messaging and therefore made it easier for citizens to access alternative viewpoints. What is more, in Russia there is wide variation in regime support both among those who get their news from state media and among those who get their news from alternative media, such as social networks.³

Thus, popular support for dictators is usually attributable to more than just fear and control of the media. Studies show that it is shaped by a range of social, political, economic, and ideological considerations. One important factor is social conformity. Because many contemporary dictators are widely perceived as popular, supporting the dictator can become a social norm (Greene and Robertson, 2019). Research has shown that Russians are more likely to *genuinely* support Putin when they believe that he is popular. Many appear to support Putin because they desire to ‘fit in’ with the prevailing social consensus. (Buckley, Marquardt, Reuter and Tertychnaya, 2022)⁴ These dynamics appear to have been especially true amidst the euphoria following the annexation of Crimea (Hale, 2022; Greene and Robertson, 2019).

Instrumental motivations also drive authoritarian support. One of the most common findings in the literature is that dictators are more popular when they are perceived to be performing well in office. Such theories are rooted social contract approaches to the study of regime support. A large number of studies have found that support for authoritarian leaders is lower during economic crises and/or when the economic performance is perceived to be poor (Magaloni, 2006; Villarreal, 1999; Remmer, 2012; Guriev and Treisman, 2020). Guriev and Treisman (2019) argue that, rather than rule through fear, contemporary dictatorships attempt to win support by convincing citizens that they are good at governing. Good

³In our 2023 survey, 65% of respondents who reported that they got their news primarily from social media still supported Putin.

⁴Other research has suggested that those with certain personality traits—notably agreeableness (a personality trait associated with the tendency to be kind, considerate, and cooperative—is associated with support for Putin (Greene and Robertson, 2017). This suggests that some large segment of the Russian population—or any society—may be predisposed to this type conformist support.

performance may speak for itself or the perception of performance may be cultivated, or both(Przeworski, 2023) In Russia, support for Vladimir Putin has long been linked to the strength of the economy. This was especially true during this first two terms (Treisman, 2011; McAllister and White, 2013; Colton and Hale, 2009), but even after 2008, studies find that support for the regime is stronger among those who believe the economy is doing well(Hutcheson and McAllister, 2021; Treisman, 2014).

Finally, support for authoritarian regimes can also be rooted in group affinity, ideological commitment, or normative attachment. Many contemporary autocracies are located in ethnically divided societies where the ruling group corresponds to the politically dominant ethnic group (e.g. Posner, 2005) . In Syria, for example, the Assad regime has a deep base of support among the Alawhite minority, in whose interest he rules(Dam, 2011). In Malaysia, the long-ruling UMNO party drew dependable support from the ethnic Malay voters.

Others use ideology to attract support. Communist and totalitarian regimes endeavored, with varying degrees of success, to mobilize the masses with an all-encompassing ideology (Linz, 1970). But many contemporary autocracies also espouse a clear ideological orientation, attracting support from particular groups or social classes. Class voting, for example, has played a major role in the rise of left-wing authoritarian government in several Latin American countries in the 2000s(Remmer, 2012; Roberts, 2003). In Iran, the regime draws support from the the most Islamist elements of society.

The Putin regime is not nearly as ideological as these regimes (see below), but previous studies have found that the regime draws more support from right-of-center individuals, those that favor the maintenance and continuation of the market reforms that were adopted with the collapse of the Soviet Union Colton and Hale (2009); White and McAllistar (2003); Hale and Colton (2016).⁵

Aside from attitudes toward the market, other dispositions have also been found to correlate with support for Putin. Although Putin has traditionally maintained an arms-length relationship with ethnonationalist currents in Russian politics, studies have found that the rally-around-the-flag effect that followed the annexation of Crimea induced a correlation between nationalist sentiment and support for the authorities(Robertson and Greene, 2017; Hale, 2022).

Despite these tendencies, the Putin regime did not develop or adopt a concrete, well-articulated ideology during the first two decades of its rule (Laruelle, 2021; Taylor, 2018) Such ideology can be limiting for autocrats, restricting their freedom of maneuver, creating

⁵Such sentiments may have been stronger during the early Putin-era, when Putin was still closely associated with the anti-Soviet orientation the Yeltsin administration (Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2006, 2011) But more recent studies suggest that the association with pro-market views may have persisted(Hale and Colton, 2016). Indeed, the largest systemic opposition party in Russia remains the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

natural enemies, and placing a ceiling on their potential support. Thus, many contemporary dictators instead prefer to downplay strong ideological appeals, instead seeking to depoliticize the public sphere (Linz, 1970; Gerschewski, 2023). This is often paired with a catch-all electoral strategy, which tries to appeal to voters from across the political spectrum.

Traditionally, the Putin regime has avoided thoroughgoing political agitation or mass political mobilization. Instead, it has more preferred to encourage political apathy and has electoral appeals in different, and oftentimes divergent, political directions.⁶ One of our main tasks in this paper is to examine whether and to what extent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed the ideological profile of Putin’s support base. We do not examine how the regime’s mobilizational appeals have changed, but we do seek to describe how the nature of his support base has changed.

3 Data and Research Design

In this paper, we analyze the composition of Putin’s social base before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For this purpose, we rely on the three most recent waves of the Russian Election Study (RES), which was carried out between September 2021 and October 2023. The survey was initially designed as a panel survey to be carried out before and after the September 2021 State Duma elections. In the first wave, carried out in August and September 2021, we interviewed a nationally representative sample of 2501 respondents. The survey was conducted face-to-face at the respondents’ homes via computer assisted personal interview (CAPI). In the second wave, carried out in December 2021 we re-interviewed 1772 of those responses, for a panel recontact rate of 70%.⁷ The second wave also included a nationally representative refresh sample of new respondents. Both surveys were carried out by the Levada Center, Russia’s oldest and most-respected independent polling agency.

Levada Center collected contact information from the second wave respondents and received their permission to recontact them for a future follow-up survey. In the winter of 2022, after the full-scale war in Ukraine was well-underway, we contacted Levada center about the possibility of reinterviewing these respondents. Over the course of the spring and summer of 2023, we were able to arrange for a follow up face-to-face (CAPI) survey that would reinterview these respondents. This third wave was fielded in September and October 2023. We were able to recontact 1038 of the 1772 respondents that had participated in rounds 1 and 2. Multivariate analyses show that attrition between waves 2 and 3 was not related

⁶An excellent illustration of this is the experiment are the various “discussion clubs” within the ruling party. In 2007, United Russia created four different clubs (sometimes called platforms) to debate the party’s ideological appeals and develop pre-election platforms. These included a liberal club, a social conservative club, and a “state patriotic” club.

⁷Analyses of attrition in these waves show limited evidence that panel attrition was correlated with regime support. Panel attrition was correlated with factors that affected the ease of accessing respondents, such as age, education, and urbanization (Frye et al., 2023)

to support for the authorities. Education was the only demographic predictor of attrition; educated respondents were more likely to be successfully recontacted. Despite two waves of panel attrition the resulting third wave sample is nonetheless remarkably similar on key demographics to the nationally representative first wave.

Our dataset allows us to describe how the bases of regime support have (and have not) changed since the war in Ukraine began. The RES survey instrument includes a broad range of questions on political and social attitudes, some of which are available in time-series dating back to 1993. This allows us to characterize how the social bases of the regime have evolved over time.

4 Putin’s Support Base on the Eve of War

We begin our analysis by examining the correlates of Putin’s popularity in December 2021, using the post-election wave of the 2021 RES survey. In March 2018, the Russian government passed a pension reform bill that punctured the post-Crimea bubble in Putin’s popularity, sending his approval levels down to a new equilibrium level that hovered around 65% for the next three and a half years. Thus, Putin’s popularity was stuck at near historic lows before Russia’s invasion. Analyzing Putin’s popularity in December 2021 provides a window into the nature of his core social base on the eve of the war.

4.1 Economic Evaluations, Issue Positions and the Media

We begin by providing an overview of the attitudinal correlates of Putin support in December 2021.⁸ The left panel of Figure 1 shows selected coefficient estimates from a series of OLS models that regress a binary measure of support for Vladimir Putin on demographic controls (not shown) and the indicated attitudinal covariate.⁹ Each coefficient estimate is from a separate model; multivariate results are discussed below.¹⁰

The first result of note in all our models is that economic dispositions matter greatly. Those who report that their economic position has worsened recently and/or believe that Russia’s economy is performing poorly are less likely to support Putin. The effect sizes are large, and this result is robust to the inclusion of almost any set of controls (see for example Table 1).

We also find that respondents who work in the state sector are more likely to support Putin, though we note that models including this variable are necessarily restricted to respondents who are employed.

⁸In the appendix, we undertake a deeper analysis of the demographic correlates of support for Putin. Key demographics are included as controls in all models below.

⁹Results are similar using a 11 point scale of support for Putin

¹⁰Full models are included in the appendix

Figure 1: Correlates of Support for Putin: Economic Evaluations and Issue Positions




Note: Standardized coefficient estimates are from linear probability models (OLS regressions). The dependent variable is a binary measure of support for Putin’s activities as President. All models include the following demographic controls: Age, Gender, Education, Size of Settlement, Russian ethnicity, Orthodox religious identification, and a scale measuring economic well-being. Confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors, clustered on region. For variable descriptions and scales, see appendix section A1.

Other issue opinions also mattered in 2021. Consistent with Hale and Colton (2016)’s work on United Russia, we find that Putin supporters are more likely to hold center-right positions on economic issues. This relationship between pro-market attitudes and Putin support holds true in 2021 across multiple measures, including the traditional left right scale, positions on taxation (and spending) and on attitudes toward market reforms. We also find evidence that those who hold more socially conservative views are more likely to support Putin. Finally, we find little relationship between foreign policy stances (toward the West) and support for Putin. However, we do find that those who view foreign policy issues as the most pressing issues facing Russia are more likely to support Putin.¹¹

The left panel of Figure 2 examines how attitudes toward democracy and nationalism as well as different types of media exposure correlate with support for Putin. The coefficient estimates shown are derived in the same manner as those in Figure 1. First, we see evidence of a clear regime divide. Putin supporters are more likely to think Russia is a democracy and that democracy is appropriate for Russia, but they are also more likely to think that a political system with a leader who is unconstrained by neither elections or parliament is well-suited to Russia. Those who believe that issues related to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are the most important issues facing Russia are much more likely to oppose Putin.

¹¹This variable is taken from a question that asks respondents to choose (from a list of 19 major issues) the issue that they believe is the most pressing issue facing Russia today. We code this variable as one if the respondent chose one of the three foreign policy issues on the list: Russia’s position in the world, relations with the West, or the situation in Ukraine.

Figure 2: Correlates of Support for Putin: Democracy, Patriotism, and the Media



Note: Note: Standardized coefficient estimates from linear probability models (OLS regressions). The dependent variable is a binary measure of support for Putin’s activities as President. All models include the following demographic controls: Age, Gender, Education, Size of Settlement, Russian ethnicity, Orthodox religious identification, and a scale measuring economic well-being. Confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors, clustered on region. For variable descriptions and scales, see appendix section A1..

Second, there is strong evidence that those with more patriotic orientations—both in their attitudes toward the state and in their attitudes toward Russia as a country—are more likely to support Putin.¹² Interestingly, however, we do not find that those for whom Russian ethnicity is a salient part of their identity were more likely to support Putin.

Finally, the results on media consumption conform to conventional notions about the relationship between regime support and media consumption. Respondents who get their news mostly from state television are more likely to support the regime than those who did not, while those who reported getting their news primarily from social media or from internet sites were more likely to oppose Putin. Telegram Youtube users were less likely to support Putin as well.

4.2 Discussion: Putin’s Support Base Before the War

Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was a classic example of an informational autocracy (Guriev and Treisman, 2019). Our findings provide some support for this interpretation. Putin’s popularity was strongly associated with evaluations of the economy and was clearly shaped by media manipulation. Regime supporters differed from regime opponents in their

¹²Patriotic Scale: Country is a 12-point additive scales constructed from four four-point scale questions that ask respondents about the extent to which they 1) are proud when they hear the national anthem, 2) angry when they hear someone criticize Russia, 3) proud when they see the Russian flag unfurl, and 4) love their country. Patriotic Scale: State is a 12-point additive scales constructed from four four-point scale questions that ask respondents about the extent to which they 1) are willing to make major sacrifices for the Russian state, 2) are proud they are citizen of Russia, 3) are angry at people who sell state secrets, and 4) believe that the Russian state is worthy of respect. These questions were adapted from similar scales that were used for several decades to measure patriotism on the American National Election Study

Table 1: Multivariate Models

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Male	-0.088** (0.022)	-0.101** (0.025)	-0.096** (0.023)	-0.074** (0.023)	-0.048** (0.020)
Education	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.009 (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)
Russian	0.070* (0.041)	0.049 (0.041)	0.059 (0.042)	0.077* (0.039)	0.081** (0.033)
Orthodox	0.046 (0.029)	0.056* (0.032)	0.044 (0.030)	-0.009 (0.027)	0.004 (0.023)
Economic Well-Being	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.011)	0.031** (0.010)	0.026** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)
Economy Worse: Egotropic	-0.077** (0.014)	-0.072** (0.015)	-0.059** (0.015)	-0.047** (0.015)	-0.034** (0.011)
Prefers Unconstrained Leader			0.104** (0.014)	0.093** (0.011)	0.040** (0.010)
Supports Market Reforms		0.083** (0.017)	0.079** (0.017)	0.074** (0.015)	
Gets news from TV				0.113** (0.024)	0.064** (0.024)
Patriotism Scale: Country				0.026** (0.004)	0.015** (0.003)
Pro-Western		-0.008 (0.018)			
Maj. Social Circle Supports Putin					0.213** (0.010)
Constant	0.608** (0.082)	0.472** (0.124)	0.131 (0.100)	-0.179* (0.105)	-0.392** (0.085)
Observations	1,610	1,380	1,354	1,313	1,394
R-squared	0.074	0.097	0.139	0.197	0.398

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

evaluations of democracy and in the importance they placed on such issues. At the same time, in contrast to the informational autocracy framework, we find that policy positions mattered as well: Putin supporters were more likely to hold center-right views on economic policies and be socially conservative. Putin supporters were also more likely to espouse patriotic views, although there is little evidence that he attracted disproportionate support from those with ethnonationalist dispositions. It is noteworthy that this relationship existed in 2021, before the "rally around the flag" that accompanied the war. The next section considers how these patterns were affected by the war.

5 Support for Putin During Wartime

We now turn to analyzing the correlates of support for Putin in October 2023, more than 18 months after the start of the war in Ukraine. As with the annexation of Crimea, the invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by a dramatic increase in Putin’s approval rating. According to the Levada Center, Putin’s approval rating rose from 65% in November 2021 to 83% in March 2022. In our 2023 survey, 83% of those who answered the question approved of Putin’s activities in office. Of the total sample, 71% replied that they supported Putin. 11.66% of respondents replied that it was hard to answer and 1.6% refused to answer. These numbers are noteworthy because they are significantly higher than in pre-war opinion surveys. In our December 2021 wave 6.7% of respondents did not answer; in the 2016 RES, it was only 1.4% of respondents and in 2012 it was 2.3% of respondents. Respondents could answer that they “dont know” either because they do not have a strong opinion or because they do not want to answer the question (perhaps due to fear of social or political sanction). Traditionally, analyses of Putin’s popularity exclude “dont know” responses, as it is difficult to separate these two motivations and because the share of “dont know” responses is typically very small. We take this approach in our analyses of the 2021 data and adopt the same approach in the foregoing analysis of the 2023 survey. Thus, in our main models the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent supported Putin’s activities and 0 if they affirmatively said they did not support Putin’s activities. However, in appendix section A3 we show alternative models where the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent supported Putin’s activities and 0 if they did not respond that they supported Putin’s activities (thus, including both explicit opposition and “dont know” responses in the “not support” category).

5.1 Economic Considerations

Beginning with economic evaluations, we see in Figure 1 that these are strongly correlated with support for Putin during the war. Those who believe that either their own economic position or the country’s has worsened are significantly less likely to support Putin. In addition, we also find (see A9) that those who reported suffering economic losses as a result of the war (either suffering a generic material worsening of their condition or specifically losing a job) were much more likely to oppose Putin than those who did not. Interestingly, supplemental analyses in Appendix sections A4 and A5 (specifically Tables A21 and A28) show that economic evaluations are among the only substantive predictors both of defecting from the Putin coalition after 2021 and of rallying to join the Putin coalition. These within-respondent analyses draw on our panel data structure to examine the predictors of opposing Putin in 2023 among those who supported Putin in 2021 and the predictors of supporting

Putin in 2023 among those who did not support Putin in 2021.

5.2 Issues and the Media

When it comes to issue positions, we notice some clear differences from 2021. Most prominently, there is no longer an association between support for Putin and center-right economic positions (see the righthand panel of Figure 1. The only domestic policy issue in our regressions that has a positive relationship with support for Putin is support for traditional family values (a proxy for social conservatism). Notably, attitudes on foreign policy toward the West are still not associated with support for Putin.

The relationship between democratic attitudes and support (see the righthand panel of 2 for Putin is similar to that in 2021: Putin supporters are more likely to believe Russia is a democracy and that democracy is appropriate for Russia, but they are simultaneously more likely to think that a 'system with a strong leader, unchecked by parliament or elections' is appropriate for Russia. Putin opponents are much more likely to see democracy and the rule of law as the most important issue facing Russia. Similarly, as in 2021, patriotic attitudes are positively associated with support for Putin. Interestingly, even during the war, we observe no relationship between the salience of Russian identity and support for Putin.

Finally, the results on media consumption are of interest. Our surveys indicate that news consumption patterns have been changing rapidly in recent years, a trend that was dramatically accelerated by the war. If in 2016 75% of RES respondents said that they got their political news from television, that number had fallen to 44% by 2023 (in December 2021 the share was 53%). Conversely, the share that received their news online in 2016 was still just 20%.¹³ By 2023, that share had more than doubled to 42%. (in December 2021 the share was 33%).¹⁴ The year 2024 will, in all likelihood, mark the first time in history that more Russians get their news online than they do on TV. Against this backdrop, we find that TV viewership remained a significant predictor of support for Putin in 2023. Those who get their news primarily from television were considerably more likely to support Putin in 2023. The converse is true of those who get their news primarily from social media: they are more likely to oppose Putin. Interestingly, however, receiving news from the internet news sites is no longer associated with opposition to Putin in 2023, as it was in 2021. The same is true of Youtube and Telegram usage.

¹³This includes both social media and websites

¹⁴Telegram usage in our sample exploded after the war: 18% used Telegram in December 2023, while 47% did so in 2023

Table 2: Multivariate Models

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Male	-0.040 (0.029)	-0.046 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.028)
Education	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.021** (0.009)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)
Size of Settlement	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.023** (0.010)
Russian	-0.017 (0.045)	-0.019 (0.046)	0.006 (0.045)	0.017 (0.045)
Orthodox	0.043 (0.037)	0.035 (0.039)	0.015 (0.039)	0.015 (0.039)
Economic Well-Being	0.000 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.011)
Silovik	0.112** (0.040)	0.124** (0.033)	0.124** (0.036)	0.133** (0.038)
Economy Worse: Egotropic	-0.084** (0.014)	-0.086** (0.014)	-0.078** (0.015)	-0.078** (0.014)
Prefers Unconstrained Leader		0.039** (0.014)	0.028* (0.015)	0.013 (0.014)
Gets News from TV			0.137** (0.029)	0.112** (0.030)
Patriotism Scale: Country			0.017** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)
Maj. Social Circle Supports Putin				0.081** (0.014)
Constant	1.122** (0.081)	1.054** (0.094)	0.832** (0.096)	0.705** (0.106)
Observations	886	828	763	742
R-squared	0.088	0.107	0.159	0.205

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

5.3 The Depth and Breadth of Putin's Support Base

On the whole, we find that there are fewer systematic predictors of support for Putin in 2023 than there were in 2021. This is especially true for positions on economic policy, which cease to be consistent predictors of support for Putin in 2023. Our data suggests that this is partly because Putin's coalition became broader and more differentiated, and came to include many who were apolitical at the start of the war. Analyses of those who rallied to support Putin provide evidence for these propositions. Table 3 draws again on our panel data structure to analyze the predictors of supporting Putin in our October 2023 wave when the sample is restricted only to those who did not support Putin in October 2021. First, it is noteworthy, that no demographic traits are statistically associated with rallying to support Putin. We also find that he did not draw disproportionate support from those who supported the systemic opposition. Systemic opposition voters, and KPRF voters in particular, were

considerably less likely to rally to Putin. Navalny supporters and Yabloko supporters were also much less likely to rally.¹⁵ What emerges as a stronger predictor of rallying to support Putin is political interest—or more specifically, the lack thereof. Those who admitted that they did not follow politics very closely were considerably more likely to rally to supporting Putin. Similarly, those who did not vote—an alternative proxy of political disinterest—were much more likely (20%) to rally to supporting Putin.

Table 3: Correlates of Switching to Support Putin During the War

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch	(7) Switch
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.049 (0.059)	0.041 (0.062)	0.021 (0.067)	0.026 (0.068)	0.067 (0.072)	0.063 (0.060)	0.031 (0.064)
Education	0.002 (0.028)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.034)	0.003 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.027)
Size of Settlement	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.030)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.025)	-0.020 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.029 (0.024)
Russian	-0.016 (0.100)	-0.044 (0.127)	-0.039 (0.098)	-0.027 (0.099)	-0.068 (0.110)	-0.052 (0.103)	-0.032 (0.099)
Orthodox	0.013 (0.077)	-0.009 (0.088)	0.005 (0.084)	-0.005 (0.083)	0.033 (0.083)	0.032 (0.080)	0.006 (0.079)
Economic Well-Being	-0.042 (0.033)	-0.053 (0.038)	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.043 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.032)
Scale of KPRF Support		-0.012 (0.018)					
Scale of LDPR Support		0.026* (0.014)					
Scale of Just Russia Support		0.013 (0.022)					
Scale of New People Support		0.008 (0.018)					
Scale of Yabloko Support		-0.042** (0.014)					
Maj. Social Circle Supports Putin	0.097** (0.032)						
KPRF Vote in 2021			-0.305** (0.088)				
LDPR Vote in 2021			0.115 (0.106)				
Just Russia Vote in 2021			-0.271 (0.203)				
Voted System Opp.				-0.199** (0.068)			
Navalny Support					-0.264** (0.061)		
Follows Politics(R2)						-0.122** (0.031)	
Voted in 2021							-0.198** (0.064)
Constant	0.572** (0.216)	1.024** (0.222)	0.889** (0.192)	0.901** (0.165)	0.967** (0.190)	0.973** (0.169)	0.886** (0.161)
Observations	254	178	248	248	200	261	256
R-squared	0.061	0.098	0.099	0.062	0.097	0.074	0.061

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses


And consistent with previous work (Hale, 2022; Buckley, Marquardt, Reuter and Ter-tychnaya, 2022; Greene and Robertson, 2019) we also find (non-causal) evidence to suggest

¹⁵In column 3, we do find some weak evidence that LDPR supporters (though not voters) were more likely to rally to support Putin)

that the nature of a respondent’s social milieu affected the decision to rally. *Maj. Social Circle Supports Putin* is a five point scale that measure that taps respondents’ assessments of the share of their friends/family/acquaintances that support Vladimir Putin. This analysis of erstwhile Putin opponents shows that those who were out of step with their social circle (i.e. those Putin opponents who said that a majority of those in their social circle supported Putin) were considerably more likely to rally to supporting Putin in 2023.¹⁶ These findings suggest that Putin’s support base came to include more more followers whose support was contingent and ”shallow.” That is, it came to include more supporters without strong ideological commitments to Putin’s policy agenda or regime ideals, such that they are.

This also points to an important conclusion that is often lost in the literature on support for Putin and that has become even more apparent during the war: Putin’s draws support from many groups in society and people have many different reasons for supporting Putin. The regressions in the previous sections showed that certain characteristics and traits are statistically associated with support for Putin, but, on their own, each of these traits explains a very small share of the variance in support for Putin and the effect sizes themselves are often small.

Figure 3: Left-Right Scale: Among Putin Supporters in Fall 2023




Note: 10 is ”right”, 0 is ”left” .

This fact can be appreciated by looking at the diversity of policy and ideological views that exists within Putin’s support base. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the range of opinions on different policy issues among Putin supporters. In Figure 3 we can see that a majority


¹⁶Also, while we cannot be conclusive, the large uptick in the share of ”dont know” responses to the Putin support question (discussed above) could be indicative of higher than average levels of preference falsification during the post-war era. If preference falsification is uncorrelated with the attitudinal predictors of Putin support, then an increase in preference falsification would make it harder for our regressions to identify systematic determinants of Putin support.

Figure 4: Attitudes toward Market Reforms: Among Putin Supporters in Fall 2023



Note: Question formulation: "There are different opinions about market reforms. What do you think, do we need to return to a socialist economy, leave everything mostly as it is, or continue and deepen market reforms? .


Figure 5: Xenophobic Attitudes toward Migrants: Among Putin Supporters in Fall 2023



Note: Question formulation is following: To what extent do you agree that most migrants come to Russia not to earn an honest living, but to get money dishonestly? .

of Putin supporters situate themselves in the middle of the left-right scale. Some situate themselves to the right, but an almost equal number situate themselves on the political left. Similarly, as Figure 4 shows, Putin supporters are divided on the issue of market reforms. The same is true of attitudes toward migrants (Figure 5). Even on the issue of how to relate to the West, Putin's coalition in 2023 contained a range of different view points: most thought the West should be treated as a rival, but equal shares thought it should be treated as an enemy and as a partner. Figure 7 shows that such divides extend to attitudes toward


Figure 6: Attitudes toward Relations with West: Among Putin Supporters



Note: Survey question is "There are different opinions about what kind of relations Russia should have with the West. What do you think: how should Russia relate to the West?" .


regime type as well: almost 60% of Putin supporters say they think a system with a "strong leader unconstrained by parliament or elections" is good for Russia, while 40% disagree.

Figure 7: Attitudes Toward "Strong Leader" System: Among Putin Supporters in Fall 2023



Interestingly, there is even significant variation within the Putin coalition in terms of economic evaluations. Even though this factor is consistently found to be one of the largest and most consistent predictors of support for Putin, we see here that his supporters have had a diverse set of economic experiences over the course of the past year. In fact, more of them reported that their economic situation worsened than did report that their economic situation improved.


Figure 8: Year-on-Year Change in Material Situation: Among Putin Supporters in Fall 2023



Note: Survey question is "How has the material situation of your family changed over the past 12 months?" .

Finally, on the paramount issue of the day—the war in Ukraine—we see divisions within the Putin coalition as well. Fifty-five percent of Putin supporters support the SVO, while 45% either oppose it (24%) or are unsure (20%). Thus, an underappreciated segment of the Putin coalition continues to support the president in spite of their opposition to the war. This highlights the point that, even during wartime, Putin continues to draw support in multiple ways.

Figure 9: Support for SVO Among Putin Supporters in Fall 2023




The figures above show that Putin’s supporters hold an array of views, but they cannot tell us whether these different views are clustered in a consistent and predictable manner. Is the Putin coalition comprised of different ideological *groups* with similarly structured sets of viewpoints? In other words, are there distinct groups whose beliefs show evidence of constraint? If so, what are these groups? For example, are those with pro-market views also more likely to hold other liberal views, such that we can assert that the Putin coalition is comprised of some set of ‘liberal’ voters that has qualitatively different predispositions from other Putin-supporters? Do Putin-supporting war opponents have a set of other beliefs that make them distinct from other Putin supporters?

In order to address these questions, we conducted a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) of Putin supporters in the October 2023 survey. LCA is a measurement model that uses a set of variables to identify qualitatively different subgroups within a population. The model works by positing that a population is comprised of two or more “latent” subgroups (i.e. “classes”), and, then examining whether the data fits those assumptions. The researcher specifies indicators, so-called “manifest” variables, that purport to measure these latent classes. The classes are assumed to be qualitatively distinct categories and not different levels on an underlying continuous variable.

The researcher selects variables on the basis of theory and then proceeds to fit models

to determine the appropriate number of latent classes. The appropriate number of classes is then determined by comparing model fit across specifications. Latent class analysis of Putin supporters indicates that his supporters can be classified into three distinct groups, discussed below¹⁷ The first row of Table 4 shows the share of the sample that was classified into each of the three classes. The table also show the manifest variables that were selected for classifying Putin supporters and how these variables are related to the latent classes. Each entry show the predicted mean of that variable for the specified latent class. Thus, for example, the predicted mean of the binary war support variable among "Pro-Putin Liberals" is .18, which suggests that 18% of the respondents that were classified in this category support the war in Ukraine. The class names are assigned based on substantive interpretation of the model results, in particular how different variable map onto the three latent classes. Figure 10 shows several of these key results in graphical form.

Figure 10:



In our analysis, we find that Putin supporters can be subdivided into three groups that we call: —*Pro-Putin Liberals*, *Left-Imperialists*, and *Fairweather Friends*. The first two groups comprise 37% and 45% of his supporters, respectively, while the *Fairweather Friends* comprise 19%. Pro-Putin liberals are clearly distinguished by opposition to the war. These Putin supporters are also more pro-market, more pro-Western, more concerned about economic issues (relative to foreign policy). They are also somewhat less likely to endorse the idea of a strong leader for Russia. They are not less xenophobic or patriotic than the other main group of Putin supporters, but on the whole they tend to exhibit more liberal atti-

¹⁷Model fit statistics (such as the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria) suggest that the three class model is a better fit than the one, two, or four class model. The entropy of the three class model presented here is 0.695

Table 4: Predicted Latent Class Means

	Pro-Putin Liberals	Left-Imperialists	Fair-Weather Friends
	37%	45%	19%
War Support	0.178	0.837	0.547
War Pride			
Pride in War=1	0.331	9.41e-08	0.111
Pride in War=2	0.236	0.109	0.236
Pride in War=3	0.351	0.207	0.351
Pride in War=4	0.0723	0.398	0.207
Pride in War=5	0.0100	0.286	0.0955
How Should Russia Orient to West?			
<i>Enemy</i>	0.107	0.366	0.300
<i>Rival</i>	0.363	0.458	0.520
<i>Partner</i>	0.445	0.160	0.158
<i>Ally</i>	0.0847	0.0170	0.0223
Patriotism Scale: Country	16.59	17.88	10.68
Opposed Putin in 2021	0.188	0.138	0.523
Market Attitudes			
<i>Return to Socialist Economy</i>	0.319	0.442	0.514
<i>Leave as is</i>	0.206	0.143	0.162
<i>Continue/deepen market reforms</i>	0.475	0.415	0.324
Priority: Econ. Issues	0.422	0.308	0.424
Russian Identity Salient	0.494	0.571	0.393
Migrants Are Dishonest			
<i>Completely Disagree</i>	0.125	0.131	0.121
<i>Somewhat Disagree</i>	0.307	0.266	0.264
<i>Somewhat Agree</i>	0.328	0.260	0.305
<i>Completely Agree</i>	0.240	0.342	0.310
State Should do More to Support Trad. Values			
<i>Supports Trad. Values=1</i>	0.0116	0.00817	0.00868
<i>Supports Trad. Values=2</i>	0.0447	0.00731	0.0552
<i>Supports Trad. Values=3</i>	0.157	0.173	0.251
<i>Supports Trad. Values=4</i>		0.812	0.685
Strong Leader is Appropriate for Russia			
Not at all appropriate	0.189	0.0867	0.179
Somewhat Inappropriate	0.265	0.210	0.313
Somewhat appropriate	0.367	0.418	0.311
Completely appropriate	0.179	0.285	0.197
Voted in 2021	0.514	0.659	0.333
Discuss Politics Often	1.326	1.593	1.261
Scale of Putin Support	8.008	8.979	7.834
Observations	747		

tudes than do other Putin supporters. Pro-Putin Liberals mostly supported Putin in 2021 as well. One interpretation of this group is that it corresponds with the traditional center-right

tendencies that previous studies have found to be associated with regime support (Hale and Colton, 2016; Colton and Hale, 2009) ¹⁸

Left-Imperialists tend to hold views that are starkly opposed to those of *Pro-Putin Liberals*. They support the war and do so enthusiastically (e.g. they are more likely to say they take great pride in it). They hold strongly anti-Western foreign policy views, and they are significantly more inclined to a socialist economic system. They report high levels of patriotism, and are more likely to say that being ethnically Russian is a salient part of their identity. They are most supportive of the idea that Russia should be governed by a strong leader that is unchecked by elections or parliament. This group also mostly supported Putin in 2021, and interestingly, they exhibit the highest levels of support for Putin on the 10 point scale.

Finally, *Fairweather Friends* are those who were far more likely to have opposed Putin in 2021, and only rallied to support him after the war. Consistent with the analysis of rallying above this class of Putin supporters is the least politically active (less likely to have voted in 2021 and less likely to discuss politics with friends and family). They also have the lowest levels of support for Putin on the 10 point feeling thermometer. Interestingly, they are also the most economically left-wing and are strongly anti-western. But their other attitudes are mixed, and they include an even mix of war supporters and opponents.

Several aspects of these analyses deserve special attention.¹⁹ First, it appears that the war has created divisions within Putin’s coalition that did not exist before. Latent Class Analysis of Putin’s coalition in December 2021, reveals only 2 latent classes, with 87% of supporters in a single class.²⁰ The war appears to have created a cleavage within the Putin coalition, with other political attitudes clustering around the war divide.

It is noteworthy that the *Fairweather Friends* class has a mix of political views. These are predominantly respondents who rallied to Putin after the war. Contrary to some prevailing wisdom, this group is less nationalistic than Putin’s pre-existing supporters, and is, in fact, evenly divided on the war. On average, it does not seem that they they were drawn to Putin because of their nationalist or expansionist views. Those who were swept up in the rally also exhibit the lowest levels of support for Putin (on the 10 point scale), and are ideologically distinct from the regime’s other two core bases. If regime support begins to falter, it stands

¹⁸The term liberal is used here in relative terms. These voters hold viewpoints that are more liberal than the average Putin supporter, and likely, by extension, the median respondent, but their views are not as liberal as those of Navalny supporters or of those who support liberal politicians in Russia

¹⁹It is also possible to model the predictors of class membership, a technique called Latent Class Regression. Thus, for example, we can model the demographic traits that are associated with being a *Pro-Putin Liberal*, *Left-Imperialist*, or *Fairweather Friend*. Figures A11, A12, and A13 in the appendix show how various demographic traits are predicted to relate to the classes of Putin supporters. As the figures show, *Left-imperialists* are older, lower income, and more likely to be men than are *Pro-Putin Liberals*. Figure A14 also shows television news consumption relates to the classes *Fairweather Friends* are less likely to get their news from TV than either *Pro-Putin Liberals* or *Left-Imperialists*.

²⁰Perhaps more importantly, class differentiation in the 2021 model is not well grounded in theory.

to reason that this group would desert the regime first.

Finally, as regards the regime's two strongest bases of support, *Pro-Putin Liberals* and *Left-Imperialists*, it is noteworthy that the former persist as a sub-population of Putin supporters. Most popular narratives imply that his support base is highly nationalistic, increasingly socialist, and has war fever. This analysis suggests that there are limits to that viewpoint. At the same time, it is indeed the case that *Left Imperialists* are now the largest subset of Putin's supporters. It is undoubtedly the case that, over time, Putin's supporters have become more nationalist, anti-Western, and left-leaning in their economic views. Our surveys bear this out, even if they demonstrate the error of viewing Putin's coalition as a monolith.

6 Conclusion

This paper examined the correlates of support for Vladimir Putin before and after the invasion of Ukraine. In both time periods, Putin's support coalition was broad and diverse, but this has become even more evident after the invasion of Ukraine. He draws support from across the left-right spectrum, from democrats and authoritarians, from nationalists and non-nationalists, even from many who oppose the war in Ukraine. Some of his support appears deep rooted, but much of it appears to be passive or contingent on performance.

The Putin regime is not one founded on social bifurcation or high levels of ideological polarization. Recent (half-hearted) attempts at Soviet-style agitation jar against 20 years of efforts to depoliticize the public sphere. Indeed, the diversity of Putin's coalition makes it hard to polarize society around "us vs them" distinctions. This contradiction helps explain why the regime has sought to both mobilize society in support of the war and downplay the war's significance. Such a strategy reflects the joint necessity of engaging in ideological work to rally the home front, while also accepting the reality of Putin's diverse coalition.

References

- Buckley, Noah, Kyle L Marquardt, Ora John Reuter and Katerina Tertytchnaya. 2022. “Endogenous popularity: How perceptions of support affect the popularity of authoritarian regimes.” *American Political Science Review* pp. 1–7.
- Colton, Timothy J and Henry E Hale. 2009. “The Putin vote: Presidential electorates in a hybrid regime.” *Slavic review* 68(3):473–503.
- Dam, Nikolaos van. 2011. “The struggle for power in Syria.” *The Struggle for Power in Syria* pp. 1–272.
- Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. “Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia.” *American Economic Review* 101(7):3253–3285.
- Frye, Timothy, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L Marquardt and Ora John Reuter. 2017. “Is Putin’s popularity real?” *Post-soviet affairs* 33(1):1–15.
- Frye, Timothy, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L Marquardt and Ora John Reuter. 2023. “Is Putin’s popularity (still) real? A cautionary note on using list experiments to measure popularity in authoritarian regimes.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 39(3):213–222.
- Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. “Sources of popular support for authoritarian regimes.” *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 319–347.
- Gerschewski, Johannes. 2023. *The two logics of autocratic rule*. Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, Samuel A and Graeme B Robertson. 2019. *Putin v. the people: The perilous politics of a divided Russia*. Yale University Press.
- Greene, Samuel and Graeme Robertson. 2017. “Agreeable authoritarians: Personality and politics in contemporary Russia.” *Comparative Political Studies* 50(13):1802–1834.
- Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Treisman. 2019. “Informational autocrats.” *Journal of economic perspectives* 33(4):100–127.
- Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Treisman. 2020. “The popularity of authoritarian leaders: A cross-national investigation.” *World Politics* 72(4):601–638.
- Hale, Henry E. 2022. “Authoritarian rallying as reputational cascade? Evidence from Putin’s popularity surge after Crimea.” *American Political Science Review* 116(2):580–594.
- Hale, Henry and Timothy Colton. 2016. “SOURCES OF RULING PARTY DOMINANCE IN NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: The Surprising Importance of Ideas and the Case of United Russia.”

- Hutcheson, Derek S and Ian McAllister. 2021. "Consolidating the Putin Regime: The 2020 Referendum on Russia's Constitutional Amendments." *Russian Politics* 6(3):355–376.
- Judah, Ben. 2013. *Fragile empire: How Russia fell in and out of love with Vladimir Putin*. Yale University Press.
- Kalinin, Kirill. 2016. "The social desirability bias in autocrat's electoral ratings: evidence from the 2012 Russian presidential elections." *Journal of elections, public opinion and parties* 26(2):191–211.
- Kuran, Timur. 1991. "Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989." *World politics* 44(1):7–48.
- Laruelle, Marlene. 2021. *Is Russia fascist?: Unraveling propaganda east and west*. Cornell University Press.
- Linz, Juan. 1970. An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain. In *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*. Free Press.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico*. Vol. 296 Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
- Mauk, Marlene. 2020. *Citizen support for democratic and autocratic regimes*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- McAllister, Ian and Stephen White. 2013. 'It's the economy, comrade!' Parties and voters in the 2007 Russian Duma election. In *Power and Policy in Putin's Russia*. Routledge pp. 53–79.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2023. "Formal models of authoritarian regimes: A critique." *Perspectives on Politics* 21(3):979–988.
- Remmer, Karen L. 2012. "The rise of Leftist–Populist Governance in Latin America: the roots of electoral change." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(8):947–972.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 2003. "Social correlates of party system demise and populist resurgence in Venezuela." *Latin American politics and society* 45(3):35–57.
- Robertson, Graeme and Samuel Greene. 2017. "How Putin wins support." *J. Democracy* 28:86.

- Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Neil Munro. 2006. *Russia transformed: Developing popular support for a new regime*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Neil Munro. 2011. *Popular support for an undemocratic regime: The changing views of Russians*. Cambridge University Press.
- Shen, Xiaoxiao and Rory Truex. 2021. "In search of self-censorship." *British Journal of Political Science* 51(4):1672–1684.
- Shirikov, Anton. 2023. "Rethinking Propaganda."
- Taylor, Brian D. 2018. *The code of Putinism*. Oxford University Press.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2011. "Presidential popularity in a hybrid regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin." *American journal of political science* 55(3):590–609.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2014. "Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 30(5):370–388.
- Villarreal, Andrés. 1999. "Public opinion of the economy and the president among Mexico city residents: The Salinas sexenio." *Latin American Research Review* 34(2):132–151.
- White, Stephen and Ian McAllistar. 2003. "Putin and his supporters." *Europe-Asia Studies* 55(3):383–399.
- Yudin, Greg. 2022. "The War in Ukraine: Do Russians Support Putin?" *Journal of Democracy* 33(3):31–37.

Appendix

A1 Variable Descriptions

Anti-Migrant Views four point scale measuring extent to which respondent believes that guest workers come to Russia not for honest work, but to get money dishonestly

Democracy Appropriate Russia four-point scale of whether respondent believes that democracy is appropriate for Russia

Economy Worse: Egotropic five point scale measuring whether respondents material condition has worsened over past 12 months (1=improved significantly, 5=worsened significantly)

Economy Worse: Sociotropic five point scale measuring whether respondent thinks Russian economy has worsened over past 12 months (1=improved significantly, 5=worsened significantly)

Favors Increasing Taxes four-point scale measuring the extent to which the respondent would favor raising taxes to address inequality

Gets News from Internet Sites dummy variable equal to one if respondent indicated that their main news source was news sites on the internet

Gets Political News from Internet dummy variable equal to one if respondent reports that they use the internet to access political news

Gets News from Social Media dummy variable equal to one if respondent indicated that their main news source is social media

Gets news from TV dummy variable if respondent indicated that their main news source is TV

Left-Right self-placement on 11 point left-right scale

Patriotic Scale: Country 12-point scale of patriotic attitudes toward Russia as a country (see footnote XXX)

Patriotic Scale: State 12-point scale of patriotic attitudes toward Russian state (see footnote XXX)

Prefers Unconstrained Leader believes that a 'strong leader unconstrained by neither parliament nor elections' is an appropriate system for Russia

Priority: Demo/Corruption dummy variable equal to one if respondent rates issues related to democracy/rule of law/corruption as the most important facing Russia today

Priority: Econ. Issues dummy equal to one if respondent rates an economic issue as most important issue facing Russia

Priority: Foreign Affairs dummy variable equal to one if respondent rates a foreign policy issue as number one issue facing Russia

Pro-Western four point scale measuring respondents preferred relations with West: 1 enemy, 2 rival, 3 partner, 4 friend

Rarely watches TV five point scale of how regularly the respondent watches federal TV canals (1= every day, 5= never)

Russia is Democ. dummy variable equal to one if respondent believes Russia is a democracy

Russian Identity Salient dummy variable equal to one if respondent listed "Russian" as one of the identity groups that he/she most closely identifies with

State Sector dummy equal to one if respondent works in state sector or SOE

Supports Market Reforms three point scale of support for deepening of market reforms (as opposed to repealing them)

Supports Trad. Values four point scale measuring the extent to which the respondent agrees that the government should do more to support traditional values (e.g. family, morality, marriage)

Telegram User dummy variable equal to one if respondent uses Telegram

War Pride five point scale that measures the extent to which respondent reported that the war evokes feelings of pride.

Youtube User dummy variable equal to one if respondent uses Youtube

A2 Demographics and Social Identity

In this section we examine demographic correlates of support for Vladimir Putin. Column 5 of Table A1 shows the results from an OLS model that regresses a five point scale of support for Putin in December 2021 on various demographic characteristics. For comparison, Columns 1-4 estimate analogous models using previous waves of the RES. Several factors stand out. First, Putin draws more support from older respondents. In the 2000s, there was little to no relationship between age and support for Putin. However, after 2012 Putin's support base shifted dramatically toward older segments of the population, and this remains the case today.¹

As in previous surveys, we find that women are considerably more likely to support Putin. This relationship has not changed significantly over the years. Education by contrast has become a more consistent predictor of Putin support as Russia became more autocratic (especially since 2012). More educated respondents are more likely to oppose Putin. This finding is consistent with both modernization theory and the theory of informational autocracy (Guriev and Treisman, 2019).

¹Supplemental analyses indicate that this is not a cohort effect. The relationship between age and support for Putin is monotonic and mostly linear in age.

We also find that in December 2021 Putin drew more support from small towns and rural areas than from large cities. In the 2000s, by contrast, there was no relationship between urbanization and support for Putin. In 2012, there was a negative relationship, but the variable was once again insignificant in 2016.² Between 2004 and 2016, ethnicity was sometimes related to Putin support, with non-Russians being more likely to express support for Putin. In 2021, however, ethnicity had no relationship with Putin support. Respondents who identified as Eastern Orthodox were however, more likely to say they supported Putin in December 2021 than were non-orthodox respondents. This was not true in previous RES surveys (and was not true in 2023 either). Finally, we find that wealthier respondents were more likely to support Putin in 2021, all else being equal.³ This relationship has been true in all previous RES surveys as well (though it is no longer true in 2023).

Table A1: Demographic Correlates of Support for Putin: 2004-2023

VARIABLES	(1) 2004	(2) 2008	(3) 2012	(4) 2016	(5) 2021_R2	(6) 2023
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.009** (0.002)	0.018** (0.002)	0.012** (0.003)
Male	-0.138** (0.044)	-0.229** (0.057)	-0.281** (0.055)	-0.145** (0.061)	-0.194** (0.053)	-0.194** (0.087)
Education	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.053* (0.029)	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.039** (0.019)	-0.058** (0.020)	-0.054** (0.024)
Size of Settlement	-0.018 (0.015)		-0.051** (0.014)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.061** (0.019)	-0.051* (0.030)
Russian	-0.429** (0.098)	-0.030 (0.130)	-0.342** (0.092)	-0.245** (0.101)	0.034 (0.084)	-0.027 (0.113)
Orthodox	0.111 (0.081)	-0.098 (0.102)		0.093 (0.071)	0.211** (0.078)	0.134 (0.100)
Economic Well-Being	0.072** (0.025)	0.087** (0.035)	0.075** (0.029)	0.133** (0.026)	0.128** (0.029)	0.031 (0.035)
Constant	4.158** (0.220)	3.983** (0.239)	4.383** (0.203)	3.300** (0.198)	2.672** (0.188)	3.681** (0.260)
Observations	1,609	1,065	1,610	1,898	2,741	984
R-squared	0.037	0.026	0.065	0.051	0.074	0.051

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

In Table A2 we examine how various self-identified social groups orient toward Vladimir Putin. These regressions rely on a question in most RES surveys that provides respondents with a list of possible social groups and asks them to name the groups they feel closest to (multiple answers are possible). In 2021, we see that Putin supporters were more likely to identify as pensioners, bureaucrats, or siloviki. None of these relationships were evident in the 2000s. Self-identified pensioners and bureaucrats began to support Putin more in the 2010s, while the increase in silovik support is more recent.

²*Size of Settlement* is measured on difference scales for 2004-2012, 2016, and 2021-23, so direct comparison of coefficient sizes is not possible.

³Our preferred measure of economic well-being is a 7 point scale of financial position that ranges on the low end from "I dont have enough money even for food" to "At the moment, I dont have to deny myself practically anything" at the high end.

Table A2: Social Identity Groups and Putin Support: 2008-2023

VARIABLES	(1) 2008	(2) 2012	(3) 2016	(4) 2021_R2	(5) 2023
male	-0.166** (0.052)	-0.279** (0.066)	-0.117* (0.062)	-0.213** (0.052)	-0.261** (0.081)
Worker	-0.093 (0.062)	0.179** (0.080)	0.004 (0.048)	-0.000 (0.067)	0.074 (0.072)
Youth	0.093 (0.059)	0.043 (0.051)	-0.032 (0.052)	-0.105* (0.055)	-0.198** (0.067)
Russian_identity	0.037 (0.068)	-0.136* (0.074)	-0.045 (0.056)	0.017 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.082)
Bureaucrat	0.299 (0.212)	0.626** (0.145)	0.314** (0.148)	0.387** (0.180)	0.325 (0.226)
Entrepreneur	0.097 (0.077)	-0.090 (0.098)	-0.121 (0.107)	-0.139 (0.085)	0.100 (0.114)
Minority	0.133 (0.303)	0.069 (0.107)	-0.244 (0.191)	-0.324 (0.208)	-0.212 (0.390)
Middle_class	0.011 (0.066)	0.031 (0.065)	0.003 (0.071)	-0.072 (0.045)	-0.045 (0.071)
Industrialist	0.013 (0.156)	-0.044 (0.161)	0.066 (0.248)	-0.255 (0.204)	-0.066 (0.295)
Pensioner	0.069 (0.067)	0.183** (0.068)	0.185** (0.063)	0.444** (0.051)	0.234** (0.068)
Intelligentsia	0.024 (0.091)	-0.111 (0.071)	0.085 (0.085)	-0.028 (0.064)	-0.248** (0.115)
Peasant	-0.074 (0.074)	0.160 (0.103)	0.151 (0.096)	-0.103 (0.070)	-0.088 (0.118)
Budget_Worker	0.033 (0.077)	0.058 (0.081)	0.026 (0.077)	-0.008 (0.085)	-0.074 (0.083)
Jewish	-0.390 (0.262)	-0.086 (0.170)	-0.119 (0.178)	-0.159 (0.181)	0.145 (0.206)
Silovik	-0.044 (0.144)	-0.100 (0.102)	0.172* (0.093)	0.309** (0.096)	0.383** (0.135)
Constant	3.836** (0.078)	3.574** (0.104)	3.705** (0.048)	3.539** (0.063)	4.024** (0.071)
Observations	1,104	1,642	1,983	2,776	993
R-squared	0.025	0.054	0.023	0.046	0.044

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

In sum, our data suggest that Putin's support base has grown older and likely less urban over the course of the past fifteen years. It also shifted in favor of state-dependent social strata.

A3 Full Specifications: Support for Putin in December 2021

Table A3: Demographics and Economics

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support	(5) Support
Age	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Male	-0.085** (0.019)	-0.088** (0.022)	-0.100** (0.021)	-0.086** (0.019)	-0.057* (0.029)
Education	-0.023** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.023** (0.008)	-0.003 (0.014)
Size of Settlement	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.005 (0.014)
Russian	0.011 (0.034)	0.070* (0.042)	0.041 (0.040)	0.012 (0.035)	0.016 (0.053)
Orthodox	0.076** (0.026)	0.046 (0.029)	0.044 (0.027)	0.073** (0.026)	0.077** (0.038)
Economic Well-Being	0.047** (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.040** (0.012)	0.044** (0.011)	0.056** (0.018)
Egotropic Econ		-0.077** (0.014)			
Sociotropic Econ			-0.129** (0.012)		
Priority: Econ. Issues				-0.000 (0.022)	
State Sector					0.081** (0.030)
Constant	0.445** (0.074)	0.609** (0.082)	0.790** (0.087)	0.448** (0.075)	0.219* (0.118)
Observations	2,748	1,610	1,496	2,708	924
R-squared	0.052	0.073	0.129	0.050	0.040

Robust Standard Errors
 Clustered on Region
 in Parentheses

Table A4: Identity Groups

VARIABLES	(1) Support
male	-0.080** (0.016)
Worker	-0.019 (0.023)
Youth	-0.001 (0.020)
Russian_identity	0.026 (0.018)
Bureaucrat	0.102 (0.068)
Entrepreneur	-0.031 (0.028)
Minority	-0.128* (0.066)
Middle_class	-0.017 (0.020)
Industrialist	-0.059 (0.070)
Pensioner	0.119** (0.019)
Intelligentsia	0.002 (0.025)
Peasant	-0.063** (0.030)
Budget_Worker	0.024 (0.028)
Jewish	-0.089 (0.061)
Silovik	0.043 (0.032)
Constant	0.671** (0.023)
Observations	2,778
R-squared	0.030

Robust Standard Errors
Clustered on Region
in Parentheses

Table A5: Issues and Ideas

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Male	-0.091** (0.021)	-0.085** (0.019)	-0.081** (0.019)	-0.088** (0.019)	-0.084** (0.019)	-0.090** (0.020)	-0.089** (0.019)
Education	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.024** (0.009)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.023** (0.008)	-0.021** (0.008)	-0.024** (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.014* (0.008)
Russian	0.010 (0.034)	0.007 (0.035)	0.005 (0.033)	0.024 (0.035)	0.015 (0.034)	-0.000 (0.034)	0.012 (0.034)
Orthodox	0.085** (0.033)	0.083** (0.027)	0.082** (0.026)	0.057** (0.025)	0.082** (0.028)	0.084** (0.027)	0.074** (0.025)
Economic Well-Being	0.043** (0.013)	0.039** (0.011)	0.046** (0.011)	0.050** (0.011)	0.046** (0.011)	0.048** (0.011)	0.043** (0.011)
Left-Right Scale	0.026** (0.005)						
Supports Market Reforms		0.082** (0.013)					
Favors Increasing Taxes			-0.024** (0.011)				
Supports Trad. Values				0.080** (0.019)			
Anti-Migrant Views					-0.010 (0.009)		
Pro-Western						-0.017 (0.013)	
Priority: Foreign Affairs							0.188** (0.023)
Constant	0.310** (0.084)	0.297** (0.098)	0.516** (0.082)	0.171** (0.080)	0.463** (0.075)	0.485** (0.096)	0.462** (0.077)
Observations	2,198	2,436	2,685	2,710	2,682	2,608	2,708
R-squared	0.064	0.072	0.054	0.063	0.053	0.055	0.065

Robust Standard Errors
 Clustered on Region
 in Parentheses

Table A6: Democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Male	-0.081** (0.019)	-0.075** (0.016)	-0.090** (0.018)	-0.068** (0.020)
Education	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.024** (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)
Russian	0.002 (0.034)	0.000 (0.025)	0.006 (0.034)	0.005 (0.034)
Orthodox	0.090** (0.026)	0.034 (0.021)	0.073** (0.026)	0.077** (0.025)
Economic Well-Being	0.040** (0.012)	0.033** (0.010)	0.046** (0.010)	0.044** (0.011)
Democracy Appropriate Russia	0.063** (0.012)			
Russia is Democ.		0.398** (0.021)		
Prefers Unconstrained Leader			0.100** (0.011)	
Priority: Demo/Corruption				-0.273** (0.035)
Constant	0.299** (0.094)	0.357** (0.062)	0.179** (0.071)	0.500** (0.081)
Observations	2,492	2,525	2,549	2,636
R-squared	0.065	0.222	0.101	0.086

Robust Standard Errors
 Clustered on Region
 in Parentheses

Table A7: Media

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Male	-0.086** (0.022)	-0.091** (0.022)	-0.091** (0.022)	-0.089** (0.026)	-0.093** (0.022)	-0.092** (0.023)	-0.096** (0.022)
Education	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)
Size of Settlement	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)
Russian	0.067 (0.042)	0.058 (0.042)	0.060 (0.042)	0.067 (0.047)	0.055 (0.043)	0.054 (0.043)	0.060 (0.042)
Orthodox	0.019 (0.031)	0.034 (0.031)	0.036 (0.031)	0.002 (0.033)	0.042 (0.030)	0.041 (0.030)	0.038 (0.030)
Economic Well-Being	0.049** (0.011)	0.048** (0.011)	0.049** (0.011)	0.046** (0.011)	0.049** (0.012)	0.050** (0.012)	0.051** (0.011)
Gets news from TV	0.163** (0.024)						
Gets News from Social Media		-0.098** (0.046)					
Gets News from Internet Sites			-0.097** (0.028)				
Rarely watches TV				-0.056** (0.010)			
Gets Political News from Internet					-0.018 (0.028)		
Youtube User						-0.049* (0.025)	
Telegram User							-0.093** (0.034)
Constant	0.339** (0.089)	0.410** (0.085)	0.403** (0.087)	0.672** (0.105)	0.383** (0.094)	0.392** (0.089)	0.403** (0.089)
Observations	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,273	1,610	1,617	1,617
R-squared	0.075	0.055	0.058	0.073	0.052	0.053	0.056

Robust Standard Errors
 Clustered on Region
 in Parentheses

Table A8: Patriotism

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)
Male	-0.091** (0.018)	-0.080** (0.019)	-0.086** (0.019)
Education	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.023** (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)
Russian	0.032 (0.033)	0.021 (0.033)	0.008 (0.034)
Orthodox	0.019 (0.026)	0.030 (0.023)	0.075** (0.026)
Economic Well-Being	0.034** (0.011)	0.039** (0.010)	0.046** (0.011)
Patriotism Scale: State	0.042** (0.004)		
Patriotism Scale: Country		0.033** (0.004)	
Russian Identity Salient			0.016 (0.018)
Constant	-0.030 (0.076)	0.045 (0.076)	0.444** (0.074)
Observations	2,578	2,679	2,748
R-squared	0.149	0.120	0.052

Robust Standard Errors
 Clustered on Region
 in Parentheses

A4 Full Specifications: Support for Putin in October 2023

Table A9: Demographics and Economics

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support	(5) Support	(6) Support	(7) Support
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Male	-0.037 (0.030)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.046 (0.028)	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.024 (0.035)
Education	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.026** (0.008)	-0.020** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.018 (0.015)
Size of Settlement	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.023** (0.012)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.026* (0.014)
Russian	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.019 (0.046)	-0.017 (0.044)	-0.024 (0.045)	-0.029 (0.043)	-0.010 (0.048)	-0.050 (0.062)
Orthodox	0.038 (0.039)	0.047 (0.037)	0.034 (0.039)	0.038 (0.037)	0.038 (0.035)	0.037 (0.039)	0.074 (0.048)
Economic Well-Being	0.003 (0.013)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.000 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.019)
Economy Worse: Egotropic		-0.085** (0.014)					
Economy Worse: Sociotropic			-0.117** (0.017)				
Economic Loss from War				-0.208** (0.032)			
Lost Job from War					-0.248** (0.049)		
Priority: Econ. Issues						0.013 (0.029)	
State Sector							0.039 (0.035)
Constant	0.878** (0.070)	1.113** (0.080)	1.272** (0.088)	1.013** (0.077)	0.923** (0.068)	0.864** (0.073)	0.800** (0.113)
Observations	891	886	797	840	877	865	513
R-squared	0.037	0.082	0.150	0.115	0.075	0.035	0.045

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A10: Identity Groups

VARIABLES	(1) Support
male	-0.056** (0.027)
Worker	0.015 (0.029)
Youth	-0.039 (0.023)
Russian_identity	-0.043 (0.030)
Bureaucrat	0.109 (0.067)
Entrepreneur	0.053 (0.047)
Minority	-0.190 (0.139)
Middle_class	-0.010 (0.029)
Industrialist	-0.044 (0.093)
Pensioner	0.049 (0.031)
Intelligentsia	-0.081 (0.050)
Peasant	-0.005 (0.035)
Budget_Worker	-0.010 (0.034)
Jewish	0.074 (0.075)
Silovik	0.121** (0.046)
Constant	0.870** (0.025)
Observations	900
R-squared	0.030

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A11: Issues and Ideas

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Male	-0.026 (0.030)	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.031 (0.031)	-0.039 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.028)
Education	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.018** (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.034** (0.013)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.027** (0.012)
Russian	-0.031 (0.053)	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.015 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.046)	-0.031 (0.044)	-0.011 (0.048)
Orthodox	0.046 (0.045)	0.050 (0.043)	0.048 (0.038)	0.024 (0.034)	0.041 (0.039)	0.043 (0.038)	0.031 (0.040)
Economic Well-Being	0.008 (0.015)	0.001 (0.013)	0.005 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)	0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.013)
Left-Right Scale	0.014 (0.009)						
Supports Market Reforms		-0.007 (0.013)					
Favors Increasing Taxes			-0.006 (0.017)				
Supports Trad. Values				0.096** (0.022)			
Anti-Migrant Views					-0.001 (0.013)		
Pro-Western						-0.020 (0.017)	
Priority: Foreign Affairs							0.051** (0.023)
Constant	0.841** (0.100)	0.902** (0.077)	0.902** (0.075)	0.552** (0.112)	0.868** (0.079)	0.951** (0.097)	0.874** (0.072)
Observations	725	797	871	877	863	839	865
R-squared	0.048	0.051	0.041	0.062	0.041	0.041	0.039

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A12: Democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Male	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.042 (0.029)	-0.035 (0.027)
Education	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.014 (0.009)
Size of Settlement	-0.034** (0.012)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.030** (0.012)	-0.024** (0.011)
Russian	-0.017 (0.046)	-0.024 (0.045)	-0.020 (0.047)	-0.012 (0.043)
Orthodox	0.051 (0.039)	0.023 (0.041)	0.029 (0.041)	0.028 (0.038)
Economic Well-Being	0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.014)
Democracy Appropriate Russia	-0.005 (0.023)			
Russia is Democ.		0.175** (0.029)		
Prefers Unconstrained Leader			0.045** (0.016)	
Priority: Demo/Corruption				-0.336** (0.072)
Constant	0.863** (0.084)	0.809** (0.079)	0.783** (0.091)	0.920** (0.066)
Observations	806	816	833	852
R-squared	0.054	0.092	0.054	0.084

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A13: Media

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Male	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.028 (0.031)	-0.024 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.025)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.030)
Education	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.028** (0.012)
Russian	-0.009 (0.048)	-0.010 (0.048)	-0.002 (0.047)	-0.043 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.017 (0.047)	-0.020 (0.047)
Orthodox	0.039 (0.038)	0.049 (0.040)	0.041 (0.039)	0.018 (0.038)	0.038 (0.039)	0.039 (0.039)	0.040 (0.039)
Economic Well-Being	0.005 (0.013)	0.003 (0.014)	0.005 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)
Gets News from TV	0.153** (0.027)						
Gets News from Internet Sites		-0.032 (0.034)					
Gets News from Social Media			-0.176** (0.044)				
Rarely watches TV				-0.039** (0.014)			
Gets Political News from Internet					-0.001 (0.031)		
Youtube User						-0.026 (0.027)	
Telegram User							-0.029 (0.023)
Constant	0.824** (0.075)	0.861** (0.076)	0.911** (0.077)	1.088** (0.112)	0.878** (0.071)	0.893** (0.070)	0.900** (0.069)
Observations	829	829	829	680	891	891	891
R-squared	0.070	0.037	0.058	0.042	0.037	0.038	0.039

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A14: Patriotism

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support
Age	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Male	-0.048 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.030)
Education	-0.023** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.008)
Size of Settlement	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.027** (0.012)
Russian	-0.001 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.046)
Orthodox	0.007 (0.034)	0.013 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Economic Well-Being	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)
Patriotism Scale: State	0.019** (0.004)		
Patriotism Scale: Country		0.021** (0.004)	
Russian Identity Salient			-0.028 (0.026)
Constant	0.721** (0.071)	0.629** (0.084)	0.876** (0.070)
Observations	836	866	891
R-squared	0.071	0.078	0.039

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

A5 Full Specifications: Support for Putin in October 2023: "Don't Knows" in Denominator

Table A15: Demographics and Economics

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)
Male	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.028 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.028)	-0.042 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.030)	0.004 (0.039)
Education	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.013 (0.018)
Size of Settlement	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.016)
Russian	-0.040 (0.049)	-0.037 (0.047)	-0.049 (0.041)	-0.032 (0.050)	-0.063 (0.048)	-0.036 (0.049)	-0.089 (0.062)
Orthodox	0.046 (0.035)	0.058* (0.033)	0.044 (0.034)	0.041 (0.034)	0.039 (0.035)	0.044 (0.037)	0.072* (0.041)
Economic Well-Being	0.009 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.009 (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.017)
Economy Worse: Egotropic		-0.104** (0.015)					
Economy Worse: Sociotropic			-0.142** (0.014)				
Economic Loss from War				-0.240** (0.035)			
Lost Job from War					-0.234** (0.046)		
Priority: Econ. Issues						0.013 (0.025)	
State Sector							0.043 (0.038)
Constant	0.673** (0.095)	0.983** (0.102)	1.197** (0.092)	0.826** (0.098)	0.750** (0.088)	0.645** (0.101)	0.592** (0.142)
Observations	1,028	1,018	902	953	995	1,012	604
R-squared	0.033	0.080	0.158	0.106	0.058	0.032	0.034

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A16: Identity Groups

VARIABLES	(1) Support
male	-0.041 (0.029)
Worker	0.000 (0.026)
Youth	-0.043 (0.027)
Russian_identity	-0.009 (0.039)
Bureaucrat	0.127 (0.100)
Entrepreneur	0.015 (0.056)
Minority	-0.203 (0.142)
Middle_class	0.010 (0.031)
Industrialist	-0.006 (0.088)
Pensioner	0.079** (0.032)
Intelligentsia	-0.082 (0.050)
Peasant	-0.002 (0.050)
Budget_Worker	-0.011 (0.032)
Jewish	0.037 (0.100)
Silovik	0.105* (0.054)
Constant	0.732** (0.032)
Observations	1,038
R-squared	0.022

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A17: Issues and Ideas

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Male	0.009 (0.030)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.029)	-0.026 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.020 (0.030)
Education	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)
Size of Settlement	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.013)
Russian	-0.038 (0.056)	-0.055 (0.051)	-0.060 (0.048)	-0.036 (0.051)	-0.043 (0.050)	-0.042 (0.049)	-0.034 (0.049)
Orthodox	0.049 (0.041)	0.069* (0.040)	0.053 (0.035)	0.031 (0.033)	0.044 (0.038)	0.043 (0.035)	0.046 (0.036)
Economic Well-Being	0.010 (0.014)	0.004 (0.012)	0.009 (0.013)	0.013 (0.012)	0.006 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	0.007 (0.013)
Left-Right Scale	0.016* (0.009)						
Supports Market Reforms		0.016 (0.015)					
Favors Increasing Taxes			-0.013 (0.018)				
Supports Trad. Values				0.090** (0.027)			
Anti-Migrant Views					0.008 (0.016)		
Pro-Western						-0.030 (0.020)	
Priority: Foreign Affairs							0.089* (0.049)
Constant	0.577** (0.125)	0.634** (0.104)	0.731** (0.103)	0.372** (0.134)	0.669** (0.094)	0.782** (0.118)	0.661** (0.097)
Observations	838	907	1,001	1,011	993	966	1,012
R-squared	0.036	0.043	0.035	0.047	0.034	0.034	0.034

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A18: Democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support	(4) Support
Age	0.005** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Male	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.031)	-0.025 (0.028)
Education	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)
Size of Settlement	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.013)
Russian	-0.037 (0.049)	-0.041 (0.050)	-0.038 (0.054)	-0.029 (0.047)
Orthodox	0.057 (0.036)	0.024 (0.039)	0.026 (0.041)	0.026 (0.036)
Economic Well-Being	0.006 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.013)
Democracy Appropriate Russia	0.028 (0.024)			
Russia is Democ.		0.227** (0.037)		
Prefers Unconstrained Leader			0.058** (0.018)	
Priority: Demo/Corruption				-0.330** (0.060)
Constant	0.594** (0.114)	0.616** (0.106)	0.540** (0.116)	0.726** (0.095)
Observations	929	936	953	977
R-squared	0.042	0.095	0.048	0.066

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A19: Media

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
Age	0.002*	0.004**	0.003**	0.001	0.004**	0.003**	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	-0.022	-0.023	-0.019	-0.037	-0.028	-0.029	-0.027
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Education	-0.014	-0.019*	-0.018*	-0.019	-0.024**	-0.020**	-0.023**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Size of Settlement	-0.010	-0.015	-0.016	-0.007	-0.015	-0.012	-0.014
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Russian	-0.022	-0.026	-0.019	-0.069*	-0.039	-0.036	-0.040
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Orthodox	0.039	0.050	0.044	0.030	0.046	0.048	0.046
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Economic Well-Being	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.008	0.011	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Gets News from TV	0.205**						
	(0.037)						
Gets News from Internet Sites		-0.048					
		(0.036)					
Gets News from Social Media			-0.134**				
			(0.046)				
Rarely watches TV				-0.071**			
				(0.015)			
Gets Political News from Internet					0.027		
					(0.030)		
Youtube User						-0.062*	
						(0.033)	
Telegram User							-0.003
							(0.024)
Constant	0.619**	0.663**	0.693**	1.004**	0.660**	0.709**	0.675**
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.127)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.093)
Observations	943	943	943	762	1,028	1,028	1,028
R-squared	0.075	0.033	0.040	0.063	0.033	0.036	0.033

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A20: Patriotism

VARIABLES	(1) Support	(2) Support	(3) Support
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Male	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.030)
Education	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.016* (0.010)	-0.023** (0.010)
Size of Settlement	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.013)
Russian	-0.010 (0.050)	-0.017 (0.051)	-0.041 (0.048)
Orthodox	0.005 (0.036)	0.013 (0.037)	0.046 (0.036)
Economic Well-Being	0.005 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)
Patriotism Scale: State	0.020** (0.005)		
Patriotism Scale: Country		0.022** (0.004)	
Russian Identity Salient			0.005 (0.034)
Constant	0.496** (0.098)	0.407** (0.106)	0.673** (0.095)
Observations	956	993	1,028
R-squared	0.055	0.064	0.033

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

A6 Who switched from opposing Putin in 2021 to Supporting Putin in 2023?

Unless otherwise noted:

- All models are subset to Putin opponents in Round 2
- DV is supporting Putin in Round 3, so this is effectively an analysis of "switching support to Putin"
- All models are linear probability models (OLS)
- Unless otherwise noted, all predictors are from R1 or R2 (R2 if both are available). Sociotropic and egotropic economic evaluations are exception throughout.

Table A21: Demographics and Economics

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.043 (0.062)	0.073 (0.055)	0.048 (0.057)	0.049 (0.065)	0.059 (0.057)	0.052 (0.063)
Education	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.028)
Size of Settlement	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.024)
Russian	-0.056 (0.110)	-0.051 (0.106)	-0.038 (0.100)	-0.044 (0.116)	-0.048 (0.102)	-0.075 (0.109)
Orthodox	0.034 (0.078)	0.037 (0.070)	0.025 (0.076)	-0.011 (0.081)	0.024 (0.076)	0.037 (0.078)
Economic Well-Being	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.041 (0.030)	-0.041 (0.032)	-0.042 (0.032)
Economy Worse: Egotropic		-0.133** (0.030)				
Economy Worse: Sociotropic			-0.151** (0.033)			
Economic Loss from War				-0.252** (0.064)		
Lost Job from War					-0.298** (0.084)	
Priority: Econ. Issues						0.068 (0.045)
Constant	0.836** (0.182)	1.241** (0.205)	1.340** (0.233)	1.036** (0.191)	0.926** (0.174)	0.799** (0.187)
Observations	261	259	240	242	256	257
R-squared	0.021	0.100	0.135	0.089	0.065	0.027

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A22: Identity Groups

VARIABLES	(1) Switch
male	0.020 (0.061)
Worker	-0.037 (0.061)
Youth	-0.016 (0.057)
Russian_identity	-0.068 (0.070)
Bureaucrat	0.138 (0.182)
Entrepreneur	0.093 (0.116)
Minority	-0.105 (0.192)
Middle_class	-0.002 (0.060)
Industrialist	-0.118 (0.194)
Pensioner	0.008 (0.075)
Intelligentsia	-0.196** (0.096)
Peasant	0.088 (0.098)
Budget_Worker	-0.037 (0.096)
Jewish	0.077 (0.151)
Silovik	0.238* (0.134)
Constant	0.683** (0.069)
Observations	263
R-squared	0.048

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A23: Issues and Ideas

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Switch	Switch	Switch	Switch	Switch
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.087 (0.069)	0.063 (0.068)	0.037 (0.061)	0.052 (0.063)	0.020 (0.058)
Education	-0.002 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.026)
Size of Settlement	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.022)
Russian	-0.116 (0.132)	-0.033 (0.115)	-0.090 (0.114)	-0.075 (0.109)	-0.057 (0.103)
Orthodox	0.044 (0.089)	0.058 (0.084)	0.052 (0.078)	0.037 (0.078)	-0.008 (0.064)
Economic Well-Being	-0.043 (0.035)	-0.033 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.042 (0.032)	-0.018 (0.031)
Left-Right Scale	0.029* (0.017)				
Supports Market Reforms		-0.060* (0.033)			
Favors Increasing Taxes			0.015 (0.041)		
Priority: Econ. Issues				0.068 (0.045)	
Supports Trad. Values					0.157** (0.037)
Constant	0.664** (0.202)	0.927** (0.179)	0.780** (0.228)	0.799** (0.187)	0.276 (0.188)
Observations	219	235	255	257	255
R-squared	0.049	0.054	0.024	0.027	0.066

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A24: Foreign Affairs

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch
Age	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.032 (0.064)	0.063 (0.061)	0.017 (0.068)	0.032 (0.059)	0.048 (0.057)	0.061 (0.061)
Education	-0.005 (0.027)	0.001 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.005 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.029)
Size of Settlement	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.028 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.024)
Russian	-0.041 (0.112)	-0.030 (0.107)	-0.054 (0.109)	-0.062 (0.103)	-0.038 (0.101)	-0.074 (0.115)
Orthodox	0.035 (0.081)	0.026 (0.083)	0.045 (0.078)	0.022 (0.071)	0.001 (0.070)	0.036 (0.078)
Economic Well-Being	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.033 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.039 (0.034)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.043 (0.033)
Supports Crimea Annex	0.063** (0.027)					
Supported 2014 Sanctions Response		0.088** (0.025)				
Supports Op. in Syria			0.033 (0.035)			
Pro-Western				-0.053 (0.036)		
NATO is Threat					0.154** (0.027)	
Priority: Foreign Affairs						-0.102 (0.111)
Constant	0.628** (0.218)	0.615** (0.204)	0.842** (0.198)	1.011** (0.213)	0.345* (0.200)	0.823** (0.191)
Observations	251	248	241	245	248	257
R-squared	0.039	0.058	0.031	0.036	0.127	0.025

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A25: Democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.061 (0.066)	0.039 (0.062)	0.035 (0.059)	0.085 (0.062)
Education	-0.010 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.029)
Size of Settlement	-0.029 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.025)
Russian	-0.061 (0.115)	-0.051 (0.106)	-0.071 (0.113)	-0.081 (0.101)
Orthodox	0.064 (0.076)	0.020 (0.079)	0.020 (0.083)	0.032 (0.077)
Economic Well-Being	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.031)	-0.031 (0.031)
Democracy Appropriate Russia	0.016 (0.040)			
Russia is Democ.		0.200** (0.084)		
Prefers Unconstrained Leader			0.085** (0.032)	
Priority: Demo/Corruption				-0.199** (0.081)
Constant	0.770** (0.196)	0.776** (0.183)	0.684** (0.208)	0.822** (0.176)
Observations	234	248	247	249
R-squared	0.040	0.045	0.054	0.051

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A26: Media

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch	(7) Switch
Age	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.048 (0.063)	0.046 (0.065)	0.043 (0.065)	0.019 (0.069)	0.043 (0.062)	0.052 (0.060)	0.044 (0.062)
Education	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.028)	0.012 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.028)
Size of Settlement	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.020 (0.023)
Russian	-0.053 (0.110)	-0.055 (0.108)	-0.053 (0.110)	-0.054 (0.118)	-0.052 (0.111)	-0.068 (0.109)	-0.057 (0.110)
Orthodox	0.016 (0.081)	0.012 (0.084)	0.022 (0.079)	-0.084 (0.094)	0.023 (0.079)	0.045 (0.075)	0.035 (0.077)
Economic Well-Being	-0.038 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.034)	-0.039 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.035 (0.033)
Gets news from TV	0.058 (0.063)						
Gets News from Social Media		-0.155 (0.104)					
Gets News from Internet Sites			-0.029 (0.052)				
Rarely watches TV				-0.018 (0.026)			
Gets Political News from Internet					-0.102* (0.057)		
Youtube User						-0.134** (0.060)	
Telegram User							0.008 (0.066)
Constant	0.841** (0.182)	0.912** (0.174)	0.879** (0.176)	0.934** (0.309)	0.878** (0.179)	0.934** (0.192)	0.832** (0.189)
Observations	254	254	254	193	259	261	261
R-squared	0.026	0.035	0.024	0.025	0.028	0.038	0.021

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A27: Patriotism

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Male	0.026 (0.061)	0.059 (0.058)	0.043 (0.062)
Education	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.000 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.028)
Size of Settlement	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.020 (0.023)
Russian	-0.033 (0.102)	-0.015 (0.103)	-0.051 (0.111)
Orthodox	-0.030 (0.084)	-0.017 (0.087)	0.035 (0.077)
Economic Well-Being	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.032)
Patriotism Scale: State	0.021** (0.010)		
Patriotism Scale: Country		0.024** (0.009)	
Russian Identity Salient			-0.019 (0.065)
Constant	0.732** (0.189)	0.557** (0.221)	0.827** (0.182)
Observations	245	254	261
R-squared	0.045	0.060	0.021

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

A7 Defectors: Who stopped supporting Putin after war began?

Unless otherwise noted:

- All models are subset to Putin supporters in Round 2
- DV is 1 if respondent did not support Putin in round 3 (including if switched from supporting Putin to answering "dont know")
- All models are linear probability models (OLS)
- Unless otherwise noted, all predictors are from R1 or R2 (R2 if both are available). Sociotropic and egotropic economic evaluations are exception.

Table A28: Demographics and Economics

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Male	0.034 (0.032)	0.043 (0.032)	0.057* (0.033)	0.057* (0.031)	0.033 (0.031)	0.035 (0.032)
Education	0.025** (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)	0.022 (0.014)	0.022* (0.012)	0.017 (0.011)	0.024* (0.012)
Size of Settlement	0.011 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.011 (0.015)	0.013 (0.014)
Russian	0.063* (0.034)	0.061* (0.034)	0.049 (0.035)	0.058* (0.034)	0.081** (0.033)	0.061* (0.034)
Orthodox	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.037 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.036)	-0.040 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.032 (0.037)
Economic Well-Being	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.012)
Economy Worse: Egotropic		0.052** (0.019)				
Economy Worse: Sociotropic			0.084** (0.020)			
Economic Loss from War				0.136** (0.038)		
Lost Job from War					0.195** (0.058)	
Priority: Econ. Issues						0.008 (0.033)
Constant	0.075 (0.095)	-0.068 (0.092)	-0.217** (0.090)	0.011 (0.094)	0.045 (0.096)	0.086 (0.101)
Observations	619	615	548	583	608	613
R-squared	0.033	0.050	0.099	0.065	0.051	0.034

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A29: Identity Groups

VARIABLES	(1) Switch
male	0.034 (0.032)
Worker	-0.044 (0.030)
Youth	0.052 (0.035)
Russian_identity	0.031 (0.033)
Bureaucrat	-0.119* (0.062)
Entrepreneur	0.038 (0.056)
Minority	0.072 (0.184)
Middle_class	-0.006 (0.033)
Industrialist	-0.044 (0.066)
Pensioner	-0.030 (0.032)
Intelligentsia	-0.026 (0.039)
Peasant	0.034 (0.047)
Budget_Worker	0.000 (0.034)
Jewish	-0.124** (0.040)
Silovik	0.003 (0.062)
Constant	0.137** (0.028)
Observations	624
R-squared	0.022

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A30: Depth of Support and Political Engagement

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch
Age	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Male	0.033 (0.032)	0.049 (0.032)	0.051 (0.032)	0.035 (0.033)	0.027 (0.032)
Education	0.023* (0.012)	0.020 (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)	0.025* (0.013)	0.026** (0.012)
Size of Settlement	0.010 (0.014)	0.014 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.011 (0.015)	0.007 (0.014)
Russian	0.062* (0.034)	0.068** (0.033)	0.062* (0.031)	0.062* (0.034)	0.049 (0.035)
Orthodox	-0.028 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.027 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.034)
Economic Well-Being	0.002 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)
Scale of Putin Support	-0.020** (0.008)				
Believes Majority Supports Putin		-0.024 (0.016)			
Maj. Social Circle Supports Putin			-0.050** (0.015)		
Follows Politics(R2)				-0.002 (0.016)	
Voted in 2021					-0.063* (0.033)
Constant	0.205 (0.123)	0.178 (0.136)	0.257* (0.129)	0.074 (0.095)	0.093 (0.094)
Observations	617	599	587	618	602
R-squared	0.043	0.039	0.049	0.033	0.037

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A31: Issues and Ideas

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch
Age	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Male	0.025 (0.032)	0.053 (0.033)	0.035 (0.032)	0.035 (0.032)	0.033 (0.032)
Education	0.035** (0.014)	0.025* (0.012)	0.025* (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)	0.026** (0.013)
Size of Settlement	0.017 (0.015)	0.015 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.013 (0.014)	0.010 (0.014)
Russian	0.043 (0.040)	0.063* (0.036)	0.069** (0.033)	0.061* (0.034)	0.065* (0.035)
Orthodox	-0.020 (0.040)	-0.025 (0.037)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.032 (0.037)	-0.025 (0.035)
Economic Well-Being	-0.009 (0.016)	0.001 (0.013)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)
Left-Right Scale	-0.001 (0.008)				
Supports Market Reforms		-0.008 (0.016)			
Favors Increasing Taxes			0.009 (0.020)		
Priority: Econ. Issues				0.008 (0.033)	
Supports Trad. Values					-0.032 (0.024)
Constant	0.049 (0.121)	0.057 (0.103)	0.029 (0.113)	0.086 (0.101)	0.190* (0.107)
Observations	503	555	605	613	614
R-squared	0.032	0.037	0.034	0.034	0.036

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A32: Foreign Affairs

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Male	0.028 (0.032)	0.032 (0.031)	0.044 (0.033)	0.041 (0.034)	0.038 (0.032)	0.036 (0.032)
Education	0.024* (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.026** (0.011)	0.029** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.024* (0.013)
Size of Settlement	0.011 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)	0.010 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.013 (0.014)
Russian	0.060 (0.036)	0.047 (0.035)	0.039 (0.037)	0.060 (0.038)	0.058 (0.035)	0.061* (0.035)
Orthodox	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.038)	-0.027 (0.036)	-0.033 (0.036)
Economic Well-Being	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.012)
Supports Crimea Annex	-0.037 (0.028)					
Supported 2014 Sanctions Response		-0.005 (0.015)				
Supports Op. in Syria			0.001 (0.016)			
Pro-Western				0.018 (0.020)		
NATO is Threat					0.012 (0.017)	
Priority: Foreign Affairs						-0.038 (0.048)
Constant	0.218 (0.152)	0.117 (0.112)	0.071 (0.106)	-0.025 (0.132)	0.014 (0.113)	0.087 (0.100)
Observations	605	559	539	584	581	613
R-squared	0.034	0.033	0.031	0.032	0.035	0.034

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A33: Media

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch	(4) Switch	(5) Switch	(6) Switch	(7) Switch
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Male	0.039 (0.034)	0.037 (0.034)	0.037 (0.034)	0.043 (0.034)	0.033 (0.032)	0.034 (0.032)	0.038 (0.032)
Education	0.026** (0.012)	0.028** (0.013)	0.027** (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.025** (0.012)	0.025** (0.012)	0.024* (0.013)
Size of Settlement	0.011 (0.015)	0.012 (0.014)	0.011 (0.015)	0.021 (0.015)	0.011 (0.015)	0.012 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)
Russian	0.067* (0.034)	0.070** (0.033)	0.069** (0.033)	0.027 (0.036)	0.064* (0.034)	0.061* (0.034)	0.061* (0.034)
Orthodox	-0.028 (0.035)	-0.033 (0.036)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.030 (0.036)	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.027 (0.035)
Economic Well-Being	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)
Gets news from TV	-0.059 (0.047)						
Gets News from Social Media		-0.013 (0.062)					
Gets News from Internet Sites			0.026 (0.043)				
Rarely watches TV				-0.002 (0.015)			
Gets Political News from Internet					0.001 (0.044)		
Youtube User						-0.020 (0.033)	
Telegram User							0.099** (0.044)
Constant	0.043 (0.086)	0.028 (0.086)	0.020 (0.091)	0.119 (0.121)	0.075 (0.103)	0.087 (0.099)	0.044 (0.099)
Observations	600	600	600	506	617	619	619
R-squared	0.038	0.033	0.034	0.036	0.034	0.033	0.041

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

Table A34: Patriotism

VARIABLES	(1) Switch	(2) Switch	(3) Switch
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Male	0.042 (0.032)	0.037 (0.031)	0.034 (0.032)
Education	0.024** (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.025* (0.012)
Size of Settlement	0.014 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)
Russian	0.057 (0.037)	0.068* (0.034)	0.059* (0.035)
Orthodox	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.036)
Economic Well-Being	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)
Patriotism Scale: State	-0.007* (0.004)		
Patriotism Scale: Country		-0.009* (0.005)	
Russian Identity Salient			0.018 (0.030)
Constant	0.186 (0.116)	0.193 (0.118)	0.074 (0.095)
Observations	584	605	619
R-squared	0.041	0.040	0.033

** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Region in Parentheses

A8 Latent Class Regression Results

Figure A11: Age and Latent Class Membership




Figure A12: Economic Well-Being and Latent Class Membership




Figure A13: Gender and Latent Class Membership

Predicted Latent Class Probabilities with 95% CI




Figure A14: Television News Consumption and Latent Class Membership

Predicted Latent Class Probabilities with 95% CI

